Research Results Based on the Query


ACT
ARG
SCJ
HCJ

Query: There was a married couple, consisting of a husband and wife, who had a daughter. Unfortunately, the husband passed away. Subsequently, the wife remarried another man. This new husband legally adopted the daughter. Is it possible for the daughter to update her birth certificate to reflect her new father's name?

Revised Query: There was a married couple, consisting of a husband and wife, who had a daughter. Unfortunately, the husband passed away. Subsequently, the wife remarried another man. This new husband legally adopted the daughter. Is it possible for the daughter to update her birth certificate to reflect her new father's name?



Likely Arguments


Potential Arguments by Opposing Counsel

1. Lack of Legal Standing: Opposing counsel may argue that the new husband of the daughter's mother does not have the legal standing to adopt the daughter as he is not her biological father.

2. Validity of Adoption: Opposing counsel may question the validity of the adoption process, raising concerns about compliance with the legal requirements under the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956.

3. Inheritance Rights: Opposing counsel may argue that updating the birth certificate to reflect the new father's name could impact the daughter's inheritance rights, especially if there are disputes over property or assets in the future.

4. Biological Father's Rights: Opposing counsel may raise the issue of the biological father's rights and question whether his consent was obtained or if his rights were adequately considered in the adoption process.

Counterarguments

1. Legal Standing under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956: The Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, allows any male Hindu of sound mind to adopt a child. As the new husband of the daughter's mother falls under this category, he has the legal standing to adopt the daughter.

2. Validity of Adoption Process: The adoption process must comply with the legal requirements of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. If the adoption deed or court order confirming the adoption is in order and legally valid, then the adoption is considered valid.

3. Inheritance Rights Protection: Updating the birth certificate to reflect the new father's name does not impact the daughter's inheritance rights negatively. In fact, it ensures that her legal status as the adopted child of her new father is accurately reflected, thereby protecting her inheritance rights.

4. Biological Father's Rights Consideration: The adoption process typically involves obtaining consent from the biological parents or addressing any legal requirements related to the biological father's rights. If the adoption process was conducted in accordance with the law, the biological father's rights would have been duly considered.

Optimal Strategy to Defend Client

1. Gather Strong Evidence: Ensure that all necessary documents, such as the adoption deed or court order confirming the adoption, are in order and legally valid to support the adoption process.

2. Legal Compliance: Demonstrate that the adoption process complied with the provisions of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, and that all legal requirements were met.

3. Emphasize Child's Best Interests: Argue that updating the birth certificate to reflect the new father's name is in the best interests of the child, as it ensures her legal status and identity are accurately reflected.

4. Highlight Constitutional Rights: Emphasize the constitutional right to identity and family relations under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, and how updating the birth certificate after adoption upholds this fundamental right.

5. Engage Expert Witnesses: If necessary, engage expert witnesses, such as legal experts or adoption specialists, to testify on the validity and legality of the adoption process.

By presenting a strong legal argument, emphasizing compliance with the law, and focusing on the best interests of the child, you can effectively defend your client's position and secure the update of the daughter's birth certificate to reflect her new father's name after adoption.


Relevant Supreme Court Judgments
Year From: 1950, Year To: 2024

Result 1
Supreme Court of India
Akella Lalitha vs Konda Hanumantha Rao
Honourable Judges The Justice, Krishna Murari, Ms. Kohli
Date of Judgment: 28 Jul 2022
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 3
   
   
   

8. Section 9(3) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 provides that, “9(3) The mother may give the child in adoption if the father is dead or has completely and finally renounced the world or has ceased to be a Hindu or has been declared by a Court of competent jurisdiction to be of unsound mind. “ 9. In the case of Githa Hariharan and Ors. vs. Reserve Bank of India and Ors.1 this Court elevated the mother to an equal position as the father, bolstering her right as a natural guardian of the minor child under Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Adoption Act, 1956. 10. After the demise of her first husband, being the only natural guardian of the child we fail to see how the mother can be lawfully restrained from including the child in her new family and deciding the surname of the child. A surname refers to the name a person shares with other members of that person's family, distinguished from that person's given name or names; a family name. Surname is not only indicative of lineage and should not be understood just in context of history, culture and lineage but more importantly the role it plays is with regard to the social reality along with a sense of being for children in their particular 1 MANU/SC/0117/1999 environment. Homogeneity of surname emerges as a mode to create, sustain and display ‘family’. 11. The direction of the High Court to include the name of the Appellant’s husband as step-father in documents is almost cruel and mindless of how it would impact the mental health and self-esteem of the child. A name is important as a child derives his identity from it and a difference in name from his family would act as a constant reminder of the factum of adoption and expose the child to unnecessary questions hindering a smooth, natural relationship between him and his parents. We, therefore, see nothing unusual in Appellant mother, upon remarriage having given the child the surname of her husband or even giving the child in adoption to her husband. 12. While an adoption deed is not necessary to effect adoption and the same can be done even through established customs, in the present case the Appellant submits that on 12th July, 2019, during the pendency of the present petition, the husband of the Appellant/ step father of the child adopted the child by way of Registered adoption deed. Section 12 of the Hindu Adoption & Maintenance Act, 1956 provides that “ An adopted child shall be deemed to be the child of his or her adoptive father or mother for all purposes with effect from the date of the adoption and from such date all the ties of the child in the family of his or her birth shall be deemed to be severed and replaced by those created by the adoption in the adoptive family.” 13. According to the Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics- “Adoption indicates the transfer of a child from old kinsmen to the new. The child ceases to be a member of the family to which he belongs by birth.

Result 2
Supreme Court of India
Sawan Ram & Others vs Kala Wanti & Others
Honourable Judges Vishishtha Bhargava, K.N. Wanchoo, G.K. Mitter
Date of Judgment: 19 Apr 1967
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 9
   
   
   

A question naturally arises what is the adoptive family of a child who is adopted by a widow, or by a married woman whose husband has completely and finally renounced the world or has been declared to be of unsound mind even though alive. It is well-recognized that, after a female is married, she belongs to the family of her husband. The child adopted by her must also, therefore, belong to the same family. On adoption by a widow, therefore, the adopted son is to be deemed to be a member of the family of the deceased husband of the widow. Further still, he loses all his rights in the family of his birth and those rights -are replaced by the rights created by the adoption in the adoptive family. The right, which the child had, to succeed to property by virtue of being the son of his natural father, in the family of his birth, is, thus, clearly to be replaced by similar rights in the adoptive family and, consequently, he would certainly obtain those rights in the capacity of a member of that family as an adopted son of the deceased husband of the widow, or the married female, taking him in adoption. This provision in s. 12 of the Act, thus, itself makes it clear that, on adoption by a Hindu female who has 'been married, the adopted son will, in effect, be the adopted son of her husband also. This aspect was ignored by the Andhra Pradesh High Court when dealing with the effect ,of the language used in other parts of this section. It may, however, be mentioned that the conclusion which we have arrived at does not indicate that the ultimate decision given by the Andhra Pradesh High Court was in any way incorrect. As we have mentioned earlier, the question in that case as whether E, after the adoption by D, the widow of B, could divest C of the rights which had already vested in C before the adoption. It is significant that by the year 1936 C was the sole male member of ,the Hindu joint family which owned the disputed property. B died in the year 1924 and A died in 1936. By that time, the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act had not been enacted and, consequently, C, as the sole male survivor of the family became full owner of that property.

Result 3
Supreme Court of India
Kalindi Damodar Garde(D) By Lrs. vs Manohar Laxman Kulkarni And Ors.
Honourable Judges L. Nageswara Rao, Hemant Gupta
Date of Judgment: 07 Feb 2020
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 3
   
   
   

225, Moghe's 3rd Ed).” (page 687) xx xx xx …………….But the text does not say that the son of that man, born before his adoption, ceases to be his son and loses the right to offer funeral oblations to his soul in case of his death. For one thing, according to the Hindu Shastras, “by no means can you make your father cease to be” (Jaimini, Bibliotheoa Indica Series, Vol. I, p. 742). The mere fact that the father has gone into another family by adoption and ceased to be of his son's gotra or family cannot unmake what he naturally is—the son's father. The gotras of the two may differ in consequence of the adoption, but it is not always necessary for funeral ceremonies that the person performing them should be of the same gotra as the deceased. A sister's son and a son-in-law can perform those ceremonies and yet they are not of the same gotra. So a son begotten before the adoption of his father would be entitled to perform the latter's funeral ceremonies. All the Smriti says is that such ceremonies “shall be performed by a son.” It does not make the obligation dependent upon the continuance of the father in the same gotra as the son.” (Page 690) 9. The Full Bench of Bombay High Court in Martand Jiwajee Patil & Anr. v. Narayan Krishna Gumast-Patil & Anr.3 referred to the aforesaid judgment when considering a case as to whether the adoptee has a right to give his son, born prior to his adoption, in adoption. The Court held as under: “In Raghuraj Chandra v. Subhadra Kunwar [(1928) L.R. 55 I.A. 139 at p. 148, S.C. 30 Bom. L.R. 829.] their Lordships of the Privy Council after stating at p. 148 that though adoption is spoken of as “new birth” in many cases, a term sanctioned by the theory of Hindu law, yet “As has been more than once observed, the expressions ‘civilly dead or as if he had never been born in the family’ are not for all purposes correct or logically 3 AIR 1939 Bom 305 applicable, but they are complementary to the term ‘new birth’.” The inapplicability of the theory can be illustrated by concrete instances:— (a) The tie of blood between the adopted son and the members of his natural family is not severed. He cannot marry in his natural family within the prohibited degrees, nor can he adopt from his natural family a boy whom he could not have adopted if he had remained in that family [Moottia Moodelly v. Uppon Vencata Charry].[(1858) Mad. S.D. 117.] xx xx xx (c) The adoptive father cannot give his adopted son in adoption (Sarkar's Hindu Law of Adoption, pages 281- 282). xx xx xx These instances show that an adopted son is not civilly dead in his natural family nor reborn in his adoptive family. It is no doubt true that by giving away his son in adoption the adopted father indirectly meddles with the riktha or property of his natural family, since the effect of that adoption will be to extinguish the son's interest in that property. But thereby the father himself gains no interest in the property.

Result 4
Supreme Court of India
Smt. Sitabai And Anr. vs Ramchandra
Honourable Judges J.C. Shah, A.N. Grover, V. Ramaswami
Date of Judgment: 20 Aug 1969
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 6
   
   
   

Section 14 provides: (1) Where a Hindu who has a wife living adopts a child, she shall be deemed to be the adoptive mother. (2) Where an adoption has been made with the consent of more than one wife, the senior-most in marriage among them shall be deemed to be the adoptive mother and the others to be step-mothers. (3) Where a widower or a bachelor adopts a child any wife whom he subsequently marries shall be deemed to be the step-mother of the adopted child. (4) Where a widow or an unmarried woman adopts a child, any husband whom she marries subsequently shall be deemed to be the step-father of the adopted child. 5. It is clear on a reading of the main part of Section 12 and Sub-section (vi) of Section 11 that the effect of adoption under the Act is that it brings about severance of all ties of the child given in adoption in the family of his or her birth. The child altogether ceases to have any ties with the family of his birth. Correspondingly, these very ties are automatically replaced by those created by the adoption in the adoptive family. The legal effect of giving the child in adoption must therefore be to transfer the child from the family of its birth to the family of its adoption. The result is, as mentioned in Section 14(1) namely where a wife is living, adoption by the husband results in the adoption of the child by both these spouses; the child is not only the child of the adoptive father but also of the adoptive mother. In case of there being two wives, the child becomes the adoptive child of the senior-most wife in marriage, the junior wife becoming the step-mother of the adopted child. Even when a widower or a bachelor adopts a child, and he gets married subsequent to the adoption, his wife becomes the step-mother of the adopted child. When a widow or an unmarried woman adopts a child, any husband she marries subsequent to adoption becomes the step-father of the adopted child. The scheme of Sections 11 and 12, therefore, is that in the case of adoption by a widow the adopted child becomes absorbed in the adoptive family to which the widow belonged. In other words the child adopted is tied with the relationship of sonship with the deceased husband of the widow. The other collateral relations, of the husband would be connected with the child through that deceased husband of the widow.

Result 5
Supreme Court of India
Sitabai & Anr vs Ram Chandra
Honourable Judges V. Ramaswami, J.C. Shah, A.N. Grover
Date of Judgment: 20 Aug 1969
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 8
   
   
   

The legal effect of giving the child in adoption must therefore be to transfer the child from the family of its birth to the family of its adoption. The result is, as mentioned in s. 14(1) namely where a wife is living, adoption by the husband results in the adoption of the child by both these spouses; the child is not only the child of the adoptive father but also of the adoptive mother. In case of there lying two wives, the child becomes the adoptive child of the senior-most wife in marriage, the junior wife becoming the step-mother of the adopted child. Even when a widower or a bachelor adopts a child, and he gets married subsequent to the adoption, his wife becomes the step-mother of the adopted child. When a widow or an unmarried woman adopts a child, any husband she marries subsequent to adoption becomes the step-father of the adopted child. The scheme of ss. 11 and 12, therefore, is that in the case of adoption by a widow' the adopted child becomes absorbed in the adoptive family to which the widow belonged. In other words the child adopted is tied with the relationship of sonship with the deceased husband of the widow. The other collateral relations of the husband would be connected with the child through that deceased husband of the widow. For instance, the husband's brother would necessarily be the uncle of the adopted child. The daughter of the adoptive mother (and father) would necessarily be the sister of the adopted son, and in this way, the adopted son would become a member of the widow's family, with the ties of relationship with the deceased husband of the widow as his adoptive father. It is true that s. 14 of the Act does not expressly state that the child adopted by the widow becomes the adopted son of the husband of the widow. But it is a necessary implication of ss. 12 and 14 of the Act that a son adopted by the widow becomes a son not only of the widow but also of the deceased husband. It is for this reason that we find in sub-s. (4) of s. 14 a provision that where a widow adopts a child and subsequently marries a husband, the husband becomes the "step-father" of the adopted child. The true effect and interpretation of ss.

Result 6
Supreme Court of India
Ghisalal vs Dhapubai (D) By Lrs
Honourable Judges G.S. Singhvi, Asok Kumar Ganguly
Date of Judgment: 12 Jan 2011
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 8
   
   
   

18. In Indian society, a male spouse enjoyed the position of dominance for centuries together. This was particularly so in Hindu families. Under the old Hindu Law, a Hindu male had an absolute right to adopt a male child and his wife did not have the locus to question his right or to object to the adoption. A wife could adopt a son to her husband but she could not do so during her husband's lifetime without his express consent. After his death, she could adopt a son to him, in certain parts of India, only if he had expressly authorized her to do so. In other parts of India, she could adopt without such authority. However, in no case a wife or a widow could adopt a son to herself. An adoption by a woman married or unmarried of a son to herself was invalid and conferred no legal rights upon the adopted person. A daughter could not be adopted by a male or a female Hindu. The physical act of giving was a prime necessity of the ceremonial requirements relating to adoption. As to datta homam, that is, oblations of clarified butter to fire, the law was not finally settled and there was divergence of judicial opinion. 19. After India became a sovereign, democratic republic, this position has undergone a sea change. The old Hindu Law has been codified to a large extent on the basis of constitutional principles of equality. The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 codifies the law on the subject of marriage and divorce. The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 codifies the law relating to intestate succession. The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 codifies the law relating to minority and guardianship among Hindus. The 1956 Act is also a part of the scheme of codification of laws. Once the Hindu Succession Act was passed giving equal treatment to the sons and daughters in the matter of succession, it was only logical that the fundamental guarantee of equality of a status and equality before law is recognized in the matter of adoption. The 1956 Act now provides for adoption of boys as well as girls. By virtue of the proviso to Section 7, the consent of wife has been made a condition precedent for adoption by a male Hindu. The mandatory requirement of the wife's consent enables her to participate in the decision making process which vitally affects the family. If the wife finds that the choice of the person to be adopted by the husband is not appropriate or is not in the interest of the family then she can veto his discretion. A female Hindu who is of a sound mind and has completed the age of eighteen years can also take a son or daughter in adoption to herself and in her own right. A female Hindu who is unmarried or a widow or a divorcee can also adopt a son to herself, in her own right, provided she has no Hindu daughter or son's daughter living at the time of adoption [Sections 8, 11(1) and 11(2)].

Result 7
Supreme Court of India
Akella Lalitha vs Konda Hanumantha Rao
Honourable Judges The Justice, Krishna Murari, Ms. Kohli
Date of Judgment: 28 Jul 2022
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 2
   
   
   

During the course of arguments, it was brought to the notice of the High Court that the surname of the child was changed from Konda to Akella. The High Court disposing of the petition vide common judgment dated 24.01.2014 passed the following directions: a) The Appellant i.e., Akella Lalitha would be the natural guardian of the child, but shall be under obligation to bring the child to the residence of the respondents in such a way that the child will be with them for a period of 2 days during winter vacation. The respondents shall also be entitled to see the child in the residence of the Appellant, with prior intimation; b) The Appellant shall complete the formalities for restoration of the surname and father’s surname of the child within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order; and c) So far as the name of the father of the child is concerned, it is directed that wherever the records permit, the name of the natural father shall be shown and if it is otherwise impermissible, the name of Ravi Narasimha Sarma, shall be mentioned as step-father. This common judgment of the High Court is challenged by the appellant in the present appeals. The primary issues that require adjudication are :- I. Whether the mother, who is the only natural/legal guardian of the child after the death of the biological father can decide the surname of the child. Can she give him the surname of her second husband whom she remarries after the death of her first husband and can she give the child for adoption to her husband? II. Whether the High Court has the power to direct the Appellant to change the surname of the child specially when such relief was never sought by the respondents in their petition before the trial Court? Issue I 6. Addressing the first issue, both the lower Courts have concurred that the mother is the natural guardian of the child after the demise of the father. 7. Section 6 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 provides as under :- “The natural guardians of a Hindu, minor, in respect of the minor’s person as well as in respect of the minor’s property (excluding his or her undivided interest in joint family property), are – (a) in the case of a boy or an unmarried girl—the father, and after him, the mother: provided that the custody of a minor who has not completed the age of five years shall ordinarily be with the mother; (b) in the case of an illegitimate boy or an illegitimate unmarried girl – the mother, and after her, the father; (c) in the case of a married girl – the husband”.

Result 8
Supreme Court of India
Smt. Sitabai And Anr. vs Ramchandra
Honourable Judges J.C. Shah, A.N. Grover, V. Ramaswami
Date of Judgment: 20 Aug 1969
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 7
   
   
   

For instance, the husband's brother would necessarily be the uncle of the adopted child. The daughter of the adoptive mother (and father) would necessarily be the sister of the adopted son, and in this way, the adopted son would become a member of the widow's family, with the ties of relationship with the deceased husband of the widow as his adoptive father. It is true that Section 14 of the Act does not expressly state that the child adopted by the widow becomes the adopted son of the husband of the widow. But it is a necessary implication of Sections 12 and 14 of the Act that a son adopted by the widow becomes a son not only of the widow but also of the deceased husband. It is for this reason that we find in Sub-section (4) of Section 14 a provision that where a widow adopts a child and subsequently marries a husband, the husband becomes the "step-father" of the adopted child. The true effect and interpretation of Sections 11 and 12 of Act No. 78 of 1956 therefore is that when either of the spouses adopts a child, all the ties of the child in the family of his or her birth become completely severed and these are all replaced by those created by the adoption in the adoptive family. In other words the result of adoption by either spouse is that the adoptive child becomes the child of both the spouses. This view A is borne out by the decision of the Bombay High Court in Arukushi Narayan v. Janabai Sama Sawat, 67 B.L.R. 864. It follows that in the present case plaintiff no. 2 Suresh Chandra, when he was adopted by Bhagirath's widow, became the adopted son of both the widow and her deceased husband Bhagirath and, therefore, became a coparcener with Dulichand in the joint family properties. After the death of Dulichand, plaintiff no. 2 became the sole surviving coparcener and was entitled to the possession of all joint family properties. The Additional District Judge was, therefore, right in granting a decree in favour of the plaintiff no. 2 declaring his title to the agricultural lands in the village Palasia and half share of the house situated in the village. 6. It is contended on behalf of the respondent that the rights of the Inamdar's tenants were not heritable under the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950 (Act no.

Result 9
Supreme Court of India
Sitabai & Anr vs Ram Chandra
Honourable Judges V. Ramaswami, J.C. Shah, A.N. Grover
Date of Judgment: 20 Aug 1969
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 7
   
   
   

A person having more than one wife is required to have the consent of all his wives. Under s. 8 any female Hindu, who is of sound mind and not a minor is stated to have capacity to take a son or a daughter in adoption. The language of this section shows that all females except a wife have capacity to adopt a son or a daughter Thus,, an unmarried female or a divorcee or a widow has the legal capacity to take a son or a daughter in adoption. Section 11 relates to "other conditions for a valid adoption". Clause (vi) of s. 11 states: "(vi) the child to be adopted must be actually given and taken in adoption by the parents or guardian concerned or under their authority with intent to transfer the child from the family of its birth to the family of its adoption." Section 12 enacts: "An adopted child shall be deemed to be the child of his or her adoptive father or mother for all purposes with effect from the date of the adoption and from such date all the ties of the child in the family of his or her birth shall be deemed to be severed and replaced by those created by the adoption in the adoptive family; Provided that-- (a) (b) (c) the adopted child shall not divest any person of any estate which vested in him or her before the adoption." Section 14 provides: "( 1 ) Where a Hindu who has a wife living adopts a child, she shall be deemed to be the adoptive mother. (2) Where an adoption has been made with the consent of more than one wife', the senior-most in marriage among them shall be deemed to be the adoptive mother and the others to be step-mothers. (3) Where a widower or a bachelor adopts a child any wife whom he subsequently marries shall be deemed to be the step-mother of the adopted child. (4) Where a widow or an unmarried woman adopts a child, any husband whom she marries subsequently shall be deemed to be the step-father of the adopted child." It is clear on a reading of the main part of s. 12 and sub-s. (vi) of s. 11 that the effect of adoption under the Act is that it brings about severance of all ties of the child given in adoption in the family of his or her birth. The child altogether ceases to have any ties with the family of his birth. Correspondingly, these very ties are automatically replaced by those created by the adoption in the adoptive family.

Result 10
Supreme Court of India
Kalindi Damodar Garde(D) By Lrs. vs Manohar Laxman Kulkarni And Ors.
Honourable Judges L. Nageswara Rao, Hemant Gupta
Date of Judgment: 07 Feb 2020
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 8
   
   
   

19. The Division Bench of Bombay High Court in Kausalyabai W/o Jagdeorao v. Devkabai W/o Jaiwantrao Deshmukh8 while examining the right of a daughter born to an adoptee before his adoption, on the question as to whether she is entitled to inherit the estate of her father after the commencement of the Act, held as under: “33. Mr. Paranjpe fairly stated that he could not find any authority taking the view that such a daughter would cease to be the daughter of her father because of his adoption. As far as we are aware, there is no text of any Dharmashashtra, which lays down that a daughter ceases to be a daughter the moment her father is given in adoption. 34. The blood relation of the daughter and the father continued till the Hindu Succession Act came into force; and hence we are of the view that Mr. Deo's contention that the daughter, the defendant, was entitled to ⅝th share in the suit lands, having regard to the provisions contained in ss. 8 and 15(b) read with s. 10, R. 1, must be upheld. The decree must, therefore, follow in favour of the plaintiff; only to the extent of ⅜th share in the suit lands.” 20. Similar view has been taken by the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in a judgment reported as Smt. Neelawwa v. Smt. 7 AIR 1928 PC 87 8 (1978) 16 Mh.L.J. 357 Shivawwa9 wherein, the daughter of deceased Mallappa claimed half share in the suit property and the defendant claimed her right as a widow, being the step mother of the plaintiff. However, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff was born prior to the adoption. Mallappa was given in adoption in the year 1939 whereas the plaintiff was born in the year 1937. In this case, the Court held as under: “9……………………..In our view it means and includes moveable and immoveable property, whether separate or self acquired or an interest in a Mitakshara Coparcenary property provided he has left him surviving any of the female heir or a daughter's son mentioned in Class I of the Schedule to the Act. The fact that the deceased Mallappa had come to own and possess the suit land by reason of his adoption did not make any difference for the purpose of Section 8 of the Act as it was the property of Mallappa at the time of his death. Now we shall see whether the plaintiff cannot be considered to be an heir of her father merely because she was born before he was given in adoption. The expressions ‘heir’ and ‘related’ are also defined in Section 3(f) and (j) respectively of the Act. “Heir” means any person male or female who is entitled to succeed to the property of an intestate under the Act. “Related” means related by legitimate kinship. The proviso to this definition is not relevant for our purpose, because it is not in dispute that the plaintiff is the legitimate daughter of the deceased Mallappa born through his 1st wife.

Result 11
Supreme Court of India
Jigya Yadav Thru Her Father vs C.B.S.E. (Central Board Of ...
Honourable Judges A.M. Khanwilkar, Dinesh Maheshwari
Date of Judgment: 03 Jun 2021
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 38
   
   
   

Later, the resident may want to change the local language of enrolment to another that he/she prefers. If so, then all the demographic information that is printed on the Aadhaar letter will need to be updated in the new local language.  UIDAI may also ascertain availability of POI, POA and other documents collected at the time of enrolment/update and its quality and decide to notify resident to update their demographic information and submit the required document.” (emphasis supplied) Apart from changes required due to marriage, migration, death etc., the authority takes into account the need for permitting changes due to “personal reasons”. The underlying idea is to ensure accuracy of record whilst ensuring free exercise of control by an individual over her identity. 135. Similarly, Section 24 of the Passports Act, 1967 read with the Passport Rules, 1980 permit change of name and date of birth on the basis of certain documents. The Ministry of External Affairs 48 permits change of name and other information, including signature, of the passport holder as a part of its passport services. It allows change of name under three categories: “Change of name may be allowed to the applicant in the following events: 1. Following marriage, divorce or Remarriage or 2. Adding surname (childhood to adulthood) or 3. Change of complete name.” It permits such changes on the basis of certain documents which are listed as: “Documents required (i) Prescribed Deed Poll (ii) Original newspaper cutting announcing the change of name published in two leading daily newspapers (in the areas of residence & permanent residence) – in Indian & local Newspaper (iii) The applicant has to furnish a Sworn Affidavit(s) for the purpose quoting the reason for name change.” 48 for short, “MoEA” The Ministry also permits change in signature on the Passport upon fulfilment of certain conditions which read thus: “Change of Signature For changing signature in the passport, application for new passport has to be made and the applicant must append his / her old signature along with new signature on the second page of the passport application form along with the following documents. Requirements: 1. Application form should be completely filled in and signed. 2. 4 (four) passport size (35 mm x 45 mm) identical photographs showing frontal view of full face with white background. 3. The current passport having valid visa or residence permit is required to be enclosed.

Result 12
Supreme Court of India
Brijendra Singh vs State Of M.P. & Anr
Honourable Judges Arijit Pasayat, P. Sathasivam
Date of Judgment: 11 Jan 2008
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 3
   
   
   

It follows from Clause (c) of Section 8 that Hindu wife cannot adopt a son or daughter to herself even with the consent of her husband because the Section expressly provides for cases in which she can adopt a son or daughter to herself during the life time of the husband. She can only make an adoption in the cases indicated in clause (c). It is important to note that Section 6(1) of the Act requires that the person who wants to adopt a son or a daughter must have the capacity and also the right to take in adoption. Section 8 speaks of what is described as capacity. Section 11 which lays down the condition for a valid adoption requires that in case of adoption of a son, the mother by whom the adoption is made must not have a Hindu son or sons son or grand son by legitimate blood relationship or by adoption living at the time of adoption. It follows from the language of Section 8 read with Clauses (i)& (ii) of Section 11 that the female Hindu has the capacity and right to have both adopted son and adopted daughter provided there is compliance of the requirements and conditions of such adoption laid down in the Act. Any adoption made by a female Hindu who does not have requisite capacity to take in adoption or the right to take in adoption is null and void. It is clear that only a female Hindu who is married and whose marriage has been dissolved i.e. who is a divorcee has the capacity to adopt. Admittedly in the instant case there is no dissolution of the marriage. All that the evidence led points out is that the husband and wife were staying separately for a very long period and Mishri Bai was living a life like a divorced woman. There is conceptual and contextual difference between a divorced woman and one who is leading life like a divorced woman. Both cannot be equated. Therefore in law Mishri Bai was not entitled to the declaration sought for. Here comes the social issue. A lady because of her physical deformity lived separately from her husband and that too for a very long period right from the date of marriage. But in the eye of law they continued to be husband and wife because there was no dissolution of marriage or a divorce in the eye of law. Brajendra Singh was adopted by Mishri Bai so that he can look after her. There is no dispute that Brajendra Singh was in fact doing so. There is no dispute that the property given to him by the will executed by Mishri Bai is to be retained by him. It is only the other portion of the land originally held by Mishri Bai which is the bone of contention. Section 5 provides that adoptions are to be regulated in terms of the provisions contained in Chapter II. Section 6 deals with the requisites of a valid adoption. Section 11 prohibits adoption; in case it is of a son, where the adoptive father or mother by whom the adoption is made has a Hindu son, sons son, or sons sons son, whether by legitimate blood relationship or by adoption, living at the time of adoption.

Result 13
Supreme Court of India
Smt. Vijayalakshmamma & Anr vs B. T. Shankar
Honourable Judges D.P. Mohapatra, Doraiswamy Raju
Date of Judgment: 26 Mar 2001
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 16
   
   
   

Pra. 140] , it was observed as hereunder:- 8. The second provision, which was ignored by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, is one contained in S. 12 itself. The section, in its principal clause, not only lays down that the adopted child shall be deemed to be the child of his or her adoptive father or mother for all purposes with effect from the date of the adoption, but, in addition, goes on to define the rights of such an adopted child. It lays down that from such date all the ties of the child in the family of his or her birth shall be deemed to be severed and replaced by those created by the adoption in the adoptive family. A question naturally arises what is the adoptive family of a child who is adopted by a widow, or by a married woman whose husband has completely and finally renounced the world or has been declared to be of unsound mind even though alive. It is well recognised that, after a female is married, she belongs to the family of her husband. The child adopted by her must also, therefore, belong to the same family. On adoption by a widow, therefore, the adopted son is to be deemed to be a member of the family of the deceased husband of the widow. Further still, he loses all his rights in the family of his birth and those rights are replaced by the rights created by the adoption in the adoptive family. The right, which the child had, to succeed to property by virtue of being the son of his natural father, in the family of his birth, is, thus, clearly to be replaced by similar rights in the adoptive family, and, consequently, he would certainly obtain those rights in the capacity of a member of that family as an adopted son of the deceased husband of the widow, or the married female, taking him in adoption. This provision in S. 12 of the Act, thus, itself makes it clear that, on adoption by a Hindu female who has been married, the adopted son will, in effect, be the adopted son of her husband also.

Result 14
Supreme Court of India
Dinaji And Ors vs Daddi And Ors
Honourable Judges G.L. Oza, M. Fathima Beevi
Date of Judgment: 10 Nov 1989
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 4
   
   
   

Section 12 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act reads as follows: "12. Effects of adoption: An adopted child shall be deemed to be the child of his or her adoptive father of mother for all purposes with effect from the date of the adoption and from such date all the ties of the child in the family of his or her birth shall be deemed to be served and replaced by those created by the adoption in the adoptive family: Provided that: (a) the child cannot marry any person whom he or she could not have married if he or she had continued in the family of his or her birth: (b) any property which vested in the adopted child before the adoption shall continue to vest in such person subject to the obliga- tions, if any, attaching to the ownership of such property, including the obligation to maintain relatives in the family of his or her birth: (c) the adopted child shall not divest any person of any estate which vested in him or her before the adoption." Proviso (C) of this Section departs from the Hindu General Law and makes it clear that the adopted child shall not divest any person of any estate which has vested in him on her before the adoption. It is clear that in the present case, Smt. Yashoda Bai who was the limited owner of the property after the death of her husband and after Hindu Succession Act came into force, has become an absolute owner and therefore the property of her husband vested in her and therefore merely by adopting a child she could not be de- prived of any of her rights in the property. The adoption would come into play and the adopted child could get the rights for which he is entitled after her death as is clear from the Scheme of S. 12 proviso (C). S. 13 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act reads: 13. Right of adoptive parents to dispose of their properties: Subject to any agreement to the contrary, an adoption does not deprive the adoptive father or mother of the power to dispose of his or her property by transfer inter vivos or by will.

Result 15
Supreme Court of India
Kasabai Tukaram Karvar vs Nivruti (Dead) Thr. Lrs.
Honourable Judges K.M. Joseph, Hrishikesh Roy
Date of Judgment: 20 Jul 2022
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 4
   
   
   

516-517; para 507.) “An adopted son is bound by alienations made by his adoptive father prior to the adoption to the same extent as a natural-born son would be. (ibid; p. 517: para 508.) 7. It is settled law that the rights of an adopted son spring into existence only from the moment of the adoption and all alienations made by the widow before the adoption, if they are made for legal necessity or otherwise lawfully, such as with the consent of the next reversioners, are binding on the adopted son. The narrow but important question that arises here is as to whether the adoption made in 1956 can upset the partition of 1944, validly made under the then conditions, and the gift by Mahadev of properties exclusively set apart to him and, therefore, alienable by him, could be retro-actively invalidated by the plaintiff on the application of the legal fiction of “relation- back”. It is unlikely that a similar question will arise hereinafter since Section 4 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 has practically swept off texts, rules and the like in Hindu Law, which were part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of the Act, if provisions have been made for such matters in the Act. Since on the husband's death the widow takes an absolute estate, questions of the type which engage us in this appeal will be stilled for ever. Of course, we need not investigate this aspect of the matter as the present case relates to a pre-statutory adoption. Even Section 12 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, makes it plain that an adopted child shall be deemed to be the child of his or her adoptive father or mother for all purposes with effect from the date of the adoption. 9. The plaintiff, as the adopted son, for secular and spiritual purposes continues the line of the adoptive father and when the widow adopts, CA No.6076/ 2010 the doctrine of “relation-back” makes sonship retroactive from the moment of death of the late husband. The new entrant is deemed to have been born on the date of death of the adoptive father. Supposing there was an undivided family in existence when the adoptive father died, how far can the legal fiction of anterior sonship disrupt the doings between notional birth and actual adoption? Mulla sums up the result of the rulings thus: (p. 496) “If, therefore, there was a coparcenary in existence when the adoptive father died, then whether it came to an end by the death of the last surviving coparcener or by subsequent partition among the remaining members, an adoption validly made by the widow of the deceased coparcener would have the effect of divesting the estate in the hands of the heir to the last surviving coparcener in the first case and of putting an end to the partition in the second and enabling the adopted son to claim a share in the family properties as if they were still joint.” 11. In this case, there is no dispute about the adoption or about the validity of the adoption.

Result 16
Supreme Court of India
Shri Ram Shridhar Chimurkar vs Union Of India
Honourable Judges V. Ramasubramanian, B.V. Nagarathna
Date of Judgment: 17 Jan 2023
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 6
   
   
   

Rule 54(14)(b) which is relevant to the present case, defines ‘family’ for the purpose of Rule 54, in the following terms: “(b) “family” in relation to a government servant means – i. Wife in the case of a male Government servant, or husband in the case of a female Government servant; ia. A judicially separated wife or husband, such separation not being granted on the ground of adultery and the person surviving was not held guilty of committing adultery; ii. Unmarried son who has not attained the age of twenty-five years and unmarried or widowed or divorced daughter, including such son and daughter adopted legally”; iii.Dependent parents; iv.Dependent disabled siblings (i.e., brother or sister) of a government servant.” With that primer, we shall proceed to consider the question as to the entitlement of a child adopted by a Hindu widow, to family pension payable under Rule 54 of the CCS (Pension) Rules. Analysis: 9. Section 8 of HAMA Act, 1956 pertains to the capacity of a female Hindu to take a son or a daughter in adoption. The said provision permits a female Hindu who is not a minor or of unsound mind, to take a son or daughter in adoption to herself, in her own right. The provision requires that a female Hindu who has a husband, shall not adopt except with the express consent of her husband. However, no such pre-condition is applicable in relation to a Hindu widow; a divorced female Hindu; or a female Hindu whose husband has, after marriage, finally renounced the world or has been declared by a Court of competent jurisdiction to be of unsound mind. 9.1. Therefore, there exists an unequivocal statutory declaration as to the capacity of a female Hindu, including a widow, to take a son or daughter in adoption, in her own right. The question would therefore arise as to what would be the adoptive family of a child who is adopted by a widow, or by a married woman whose husband has completely and finally renounced the world, or has been declared to be of unsound mind. The text of Section 12 of the Act lends limited perspective in this regard. However, this Court has clarified this aspect by declaring that, on adoption by a widow, the adopted son or daughter is deemed to be a member of the family of the deceased husband of the widow, vide Sawan Ram vs. Kalawanti, A.I.R. 1967 SC 1761. 9.2. Further, in Sitabai vs. Ramchandra, A.I.R. 1970 SC 343, this Court took note of the consequences of adoption as listed under Section 12 of the Act, and observed as follows as to the as to the effects of adoption by a Hindu widow: “5. […] It is clear on a reading of the main part of Section 12 and Sub-section (vi) of Section 11 that the effect of adoption under the Act is that it brings about severance of all ties of the child given in adoption in the family of his or her birth. The child altogether ceases to have any ties with the family of his birth.

Result 17
Supreme Court of India
Smt. Vijayalakshmamma & Anr vs B. T. Shankar
Honourable Judges D.P. Mohapatra, Doraiswamy Raju
Date of Judgment: 26 Mar 2001
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 14
   
   
   

Any female Hindu (a) who is of sound mind, (b) who is not a minor, and (c) who is not married, or if married, whose marriage has been dissolved or whose husband is dead or has completely and finally renounced the world or has ceased to be a Hindu or has been declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be of unsound mind, has the capacity to take a son or daughter in adoption. A reference to Sections 12 and 14 also become necessary and Section 12 reads as hereunder :- 12. Effects of adoption.An adopted child shall be deemed to be the child of his or her adoptive father or mother for all purposes with effect from the date of the adoption and from such date all the ties of the child in the family of his or her birth shall be deemed to be severed and replaced by those created by the adoption in the adoptive family : Provided that (a) the child cannot marry any person whom he or she could not have married if he or she had continued in the family of his or her birth; (b) any property which vested in the adopted child before the adoption shall continue to vest in such person subject to the obligations, if any, attaching to the ownership of such property, including the obligation to maintain relatives in the family of his or her birth; (c) the adopted child shall not divest any person of any estate which vested in him or her before the adoption. Section 14 reads, thus 14. Determination of adoptive mother in certain cases.(1) Where a Hindu who has a wife living adopts a child, she shall be deemed to be the adoptive mother. (2) Where an adoption has been made with the consent of more than one wife, the senior- most in marriage among them shall be deemed to be the adoptive mother and the others to be step-mothers. (3) Where a widower or a bachelor adopts a child, any wife whom he subsequently marries shall be deemed to be the step-mother of the adopted child. (4) Where a widow or an unmarried woman adopts a child, any husband whom she marries subsequently shall be deemed to be the step-father of the adopted child. A compendious reading of all the above provisions harmoniously with due regard to the purpose sought to be achieved will inevitably lead to certain inescapable consequences.

Result 18
Supreme Court of India
Vineeta Sharma vs Rakesh Sharma
Honourable Judges N.V. Ramana, Surya Kant, Aniruddha Bose
Date of Judgment: 11 Aug 2020
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 6
   
   
   

The custom of adoption is of ancient origin, as observed in Amarendra Man Singh Bhramarbar & Anr. v. Sanatan Singh & Ors., AIR 1933 PC 155, and Sri Balusu Gurulingaswami v. Sri Balusu Ramalakshmamma & Ors., 26 IA 113. The adoption at the relevant time was only of male and not of a female as the custom related to succession to the property, as discussed in Bireswar Mookerji & Ors. v. Shib Chunder Roy, 19 IA 101. (h) By the expression used in the amended section 6, the daughter becomes coparcener by birth. The retrospective effect is not intended to be given to the provisions of section 6. Though equality has been brought in, w.e.f. 2005, the incidence of birth of a daughter before 2005 is of no consequence and not to reopen the past transactions. (i) The oral partition and family settlement are not intended to be reopened by section 6(1) and 6(5). (j) If the daughter is treated as coparcener at any point of time in the past before the amendment, the same will bring in enormous uncertainty in the working of the law. It can be stated that the Parliament has not intended to scramble the unscrambled egg or to resurrect the past. (k) Challenges to partition had always come when any member of a coparcenary, including an adopted son, stood deprived of the entitlement to succeed to the joint family property. (l) The scheme of section 6 is future and forward­looking, and it has to be interpreted in such a manner that its relevance is not diluted. Now the rights of a coparcener have been enlarged, and the provision has disabled it from defeating the right of a daughter from being treated equally. (m) In the light of the decision in Shashikalabai (Smt) v. the State of Maharashtra & Anr., (1998) 5 SCC 332, the past transactions cannot be reopened. Thus, the daughter, whose coparcener father, was alive on the date of incorporation of provisions of section 6, will be treated as a coparcener. Any other interpretation would cause unjust consequences. 12. Shri V.V.S. Rao learned amicus curiae/senior counsel, argued that: (a) the logic of Prakash v. Phulavati has been upheld in Mangammal v. T.B. Raju, (2018) 15 SCC 662. It was held that there should be a living daughter of a living coparcener to inherit the property on the date of enforcement of the amended provisions of the 2005 Act. (b) Section 6(1)(a) declares a daughter to be a coparcener by birth. By the declaration, a daughter stands included in coparcenary. As the declaration is to the effect that the daughter is to become coparcener by birth, the question of prospectivity or retrospectivity will not arise— daughter, whether born before 2005 or after that, is considered a coparcener. (c) Section 6(1)(b) and (c) deal with the effects of inclusion of daughter as a coparcener.

Result 19
Supreme Court of India
Goswami Shree Vallabhalalji vs Goswamini Shree Mahalaxmi Bahuji ...
Honourable Judges K.C. Das Gupta, K.N. Wanchoo
Date of Judgment: 13 Sep 1961
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 7
   
   
   

Other witnesses who have given evidence on this point have said more or less the same thing. It is obvious that if the above be the objects of Goda adoption it must be implicit In the nature of Goda adoption that anybody who would be incapable of accomplishing any of these objects would be ineligible for adoption. It is on this basis that it was urged that wife's sister's husband's son was not eligible. The argument is that the wife's sister's husband would be unable to perform the Shradha of the adoptive father because the adoptee would not cease to be the Shadu of the person to whom the adoption is made,- it was further said that the adoptee would the incapable of performing the Sradh of the adoptive maternal grand father as the latter would be the adoptee's father-in-law. Unfortunately however for the plaintiff's case 'his witnesses were unable to quote any authority except their own ipso dixit for this proposition that the adoptee would be incapable of performing the Sradh of his adoptive father or adoptee maternal grand father. The plaintiff's witness Anantkrishna Sastri a Mahamahopadhyaya, made a statement that according to Dharmashastras a wife's sister's husband cannot be adopted. As authority for this proposition he relied on a passage in Dattak Mimanea which prohibits the adoption of a daughter's son, a sister's son and a mother's sister's son and adds thus:-"This clearly proves that a daughter's son and a mother's sister's son are (in this respect) equal to a sister's son. This is just proper because there is in these three, the same degree of (prohibited) marriageship (Viruddha Sambandha)." It is true that Dattak Mimansa has in a later passage gone further and said that son of a woman who-could not be married because of Virudha Sambsndhar relationship should be excepted from adoption We have however held in Mrs. Abhiraj Kuer v. Debendra Singh(1) in which judgment has been delivered to-day that this rule in Dattaka Mimansa against Viruddha Sambandha putra is only recommendatory and not mandatory. Apart from that it is difficult to see how the wife's sister's husband can be considered to be ViruddhaSambandha-putra.

Result 20
Supreme Court of India
Shyam Sunder Prasad Singh & Ors vs State Of Bihar & Ors
Honourable Judges E.S. Venkataramiah, P.N. Bhagwati, A.P. Sen
Date of Judgment: 22 Jul 1980
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 56
   
   
   

We shall now examine the reason for the abandonment of the practice of appointing a daughter to raise a son by the Hindu society. Originally according to a vedic text cited by Lakshmidhara, a daughter was like a son, and a daughter's son was like a son's son. Manu prescribed that he who had no son might make his daughter in the following manner an appointed daughter (putrika) saying to her husband 'The (male) child born of her, shall perform my funeral rites' Aputronena vidihina sutang kurvit putrikam yadapatyang bhawedasyah tanmasyata swadhakarang According to Manu 'A son is even as one's self, daughter is equal to a son, how can another (heir) take the estate, while (such daughter who is) one's self, lives. The daughter's son shall take the whole estate of his maternal grand-father who leaves no male issue. Between a son's son and the son of a daughter, there is no difference according to law. But if, after a daughter has been appointed, a son be born (to her father) the division (of the inheritance) must in that (case) be equal, for there is no right of primogeniture for a woman". Apastamba declared 'The daughter may take the inheritance of a sonless man'. Yajnavalkya said 'The son of a putrika is equal to him (the son). Narada stated 'in failure of a son, the daughter succeeds because she continues the lineage just like a son'. From the above texts, it is obvious that in ancient times, the daughter and the daughter's son were given preference over even the widow of a person in the matter of succession. It is said that ancient commentators like Medha-thi-thi and Haradatta had declared that the widow was no heir and not-withstanding some texts in her favour, her right was not fully recognised till Yajnavalkya stated that the widow would succeed to the estate of a sonless person. In Yajnavalkya Smriti, the order of succession to a male was indicated in the following order: (1) son, grandson, great grandson (2) putrika-putra (3) other subsidiary or secondary sons, (4) widow and (5) daughter. After daughter, it was not expressly stated that daughter's son would succeed, but the parents were shown as the successors.

Result 21
Supreme Court of India
Prasanta Kumar Sahoo vs Charulata Sahu .
Honourable Judges A.S. Bopanna, J.B. Pardiwala
Date of Judgment: 29 Mar 2023
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 24
   
   
   

The daughter would step into the coparcenary as that of a son by taking birth before or after the Act. However, daughter born before can claim these rights only with effect from the date of the amendment, i.e., 9- 9-2005 with saving of past transactions as provided in the proviso to Section 6(1) read with Section 6(5).” (Emphasis supplied) 69. The Court has further observed in para 69 as under: “69. … Section 6(1) recognises a joint Hindu family governed by Mitakshara law. The coparcenary must exist on 9-9-2005 to enable the daughter of a coparcener to enjoy rights conferred on her. As the right is by birth and not by dint of inheritance, it is irrelevant that a coparcener whose daughter is conferred with the rights is alive or not. Conferral is not based on the death of a father or other coparcener. In case living coparcener dies after 9-9-2005, inheritance is not by survivorship but by intestate or testamentary succession as provided in substituted Section 6(3).” (Emphasis supplied) 70. Explaining sub-section (3) of substituted Section 6, the Court observed in paragraph 66 as under: “66. With respect to a Hindu who dies after the commencement of the Amendment Act, as provided in section 6(3) his interest shall pass by testamentary or intestate succession and not by survivorship, and there is a deemed partition of the coparcenary property in order to ascertain the shares which would have been allotted to his heirs had there been a partition. The daughter is to be allotted the same share as a son; even surviving child of predeceased daughter or son are given a share in case the child has also died then the surviving child of such predeceased child of a predeceased son or predeceased daughter would be allotted the same share, had they been alive at the time of deemed partition. Thus, there is a sea-change in substituted Section 6. In case of death of coparcener after 9-9-2005, succession is not by survivorship but in accordance with Section 6(3).

Result 22
Supreme Court of India
Ghisalal vs Dhapubai (D) By Lrs
Honourable Judges G.S. Singhvi, Asok Kumar Ganguly
Date of Judgment: 12 Jan 2011
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 7
   
   
   

16. Presumption as to registered documents relating to adoption. - Whenever any document registered under any law for the time being in force is produced before any Court purporting to record an adoption made and is signed by the person giving and the person taking the child in adoption, the Court shall presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provisions of this Act unless and until it is disproved." 17. Section 6 reproduced above enumerates the requisites of a valid adoption. It lays down that no adoption shall be valid unless the person adopting has the capacity as also the right to take in adoption; the person giving in adoption has the capacity to do so; the person adopted is capable of being taken in adoption, and the adoption is made in compliance with the other conditions mentioned in Chapter II. Section 7 lays down that any male Hindu who is of sound mind and is not minor has the capacity to take a son or a daughter in adoption. This is subject to the rider enshrined in the proviso which lays down that if the male Hindu has a wife living then he shall not adopt except with the consent of his wife unless she is incapacitated to give the consent by reason of her having completely and finally renounced the world or her having ceased to be a Hindu or she has been declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be of unsound mind. The explanation appended to Section 7 lays down that if a person has more than one wife living at the time of adoption, then the consent of all the wives is sine qua non for a valid adoption unless either of them suffers from any of the disabilities specified in the proviso to Section 7. Section 8 enumerates the conditions, which must be satisfied for adoption by a female Hindu. Section 12 deals with effects of adoption. It declares that from the date of the adoption, an adopted child is deemed to be a child of his/her adoptive father or mother for all purposes and his ties in the family of his or her birth shall stand severed and replaced by those created in the adoptive family. Proviso (a) to this section contains a restriction on the marriage of adopted child with a person to whom he or she could not have married if he or she had continued in the family of his or her birth. Clause (b) of the proviso saves the vested right of the adopted child in the property subject to the obligations, if any, attached to the ownership of such property, including the obligation to maintain relatives in the family of his or her birth. Likewise, clause (c) to the proviso lays down that the adopted child shall not divest any person of any estate vested in him or her before the date of adoption.

Result 23
Supreme Court of India
Supriyo @ Supriya Chakraborty vs Union Of India
Honourable Judges Sanjay Kishan Kaul, S. Ravindra Bhat, Hima Kohli, Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha
Date of Judgment: 17 Oct 2023
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 211
   
   
   

124. Therefore, given that we differ on the starting point itself – that section 57(2) of the JJ Act permits joint adoption by both married and unmarried couples (as held by the learned Chief Justice) – we are of the considered opinion that is not a case of delegated legislation being ultra vires the parent Act. 125. The legislative choice, of limiting joint adoption only to married couples needs to be understood in the broader context of the JJ Act, and its purpose – which is the best interest of the child are paramount. Legal benefits and entitlements, flow either from/in relation to the individual adopting (when a single person adopts), or the married couple adopting as a unit. In the case of bereavement, of such single parent, custody of the child may be taken by a relative in the former, whereas continued by the surviving spouse, in the latter. But consider, that in the case of a married couple – there is a breakdown of marriage, or simply abandonment/neglect of one partner and the child, by the other. There are protections in the law, as they stand today, that enable such deserted, or neglected spouse, to receive as a matter of statutory right – maintenance, and access to other protections. Undoubtedly, the DV Act offers this protection even to those in an unmarried live-in relationship, but consider a situation that does not involve domestic violence, and is plain and simple a case of neglect, or worse, desertion. It is arguable that both partners, are equally responsible for the child after the factum of adoption; however – it begs the question, how can one enforce the protection that is due to this child? 126. The JJ Act merely enables adoption, but for all other consequences (i.e., relating to the rights of a child qua their parents, and in turn obligations of a parent towards the said child) reference has to be made to prevailing law (law relating to marriage and divorce, maintenance, succession, guardianship, custody, etc.). When a single person adopts as an individual, their capabilities are assessed as per Section 57(1) [and Regulation 5(1)], and the responsibility of that child – falls squarely on this individual. If that person enters into a relationship, whether it later succeeds, or fails, is immaterial – the responsibility of the child remains squarely on the individual (until they are married, and the partner legally adopts the child). When a couple adopts, they are jointly assessed, and in law, the responsibility falls on both parents. If one parent was to abandon the relationship, and the other parent is unable to maintain themselves or the child by themselves– recourse lies in other statutory provisions which enable remedy to be sought.

Result 24
Supreme Court of India
Vineeta Sharma vs Rakesh Sharma
Honourable Judges N.V. Ramana, Surya Kant, Aniruddha Bose
Date of Judgment: 11 Aug 2020
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 40
   
   
   

In ref: Effect of enlargement of daughter’s rights 65. Under the proviso to section 6 before the amendment made in the year 2005 in case a coparcener died leaving behind female relative of Class I heir or a male descendant claiming through such Class I female heir, the daughter was one of them. Section 6, as substituted, presupposes the existence of coparcenary. It is only the case of the enlargement of the rights of the daughters. The rights of other relatives remain unaffected as prevailed in the proviso to section 6 as it stood before amendment. 66. As per the Mitakshara law, no coparcener has any fixed share. It keeps on fluctuating by birth or by death. It is the said principle of administration of Mitakshara coparcenary carried forward in statutory provisions of section 6. Even if a coparcener had left behind female heir of Class I or a male claiming through such female Class I heir, there is no disruption of coparcenary by statutory fiction of partition. Fiction is only for ascertaining the share of a deceased coparcener, which would be allotted to him as and when actual partition takes place. The deemed fiction of partition is for that limited purpose. The classic Shastric Hindu law excluded the daughter from being coparcener, which injustice has now been done away with by amending the provisions in consonance with the spirit of the Constitution. 67. There can be a sole surviving coparcener in a given case the property held by him is treated individual property till a son is born. In case there is a widow or daughter also, it would be treated as joint family property. If the son is adopted, he will become a coparcener. An adoption by a widow of a deceased coparcener related to the date of her husband's death, subject to saving the alienations made in the intermittent period. In Ref. Acquisition of Rights in Coparcenary Property 68. It is by birth that interest in the property is acquired. Devolution on the death of a coparcener before 1956 used to be only by survivorship. After 1956, women could also inherit in exigencies, mentioned in the proviso to unamended section 6. Now by legal fiction, daughters are treated as coparceners. No one is made a coparcener by devolution of interest. It is by virtue of birth or by way of adoption obviously within the permissible degrees; a person is to be treated as coparcener and not otherwise. 69. The argument raised that if the father or any other coparcener died before the Amendment Act, 2005, the interest of the father or other coparcener would have already merged in the surviving coparcenary, and there was no coparcener alive from whom the daughter would succeed. We are unable to accept the submission because it is not by the death of the father or other coparcener that rights accrue. It is by the factum of birth.

Result 25
Supreme Court of India
Vineeta Sharma vs Rakesh Sharma
Honourable Judges N.V. Ramana, Surya Kant, Aniruddha Bose
Date of Judgment: 11 Aug 2020
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 44
   
   
   

27.3. In Vaishali Satish Ganorkar v. Satish Keshaorao Ganorkar, AIR 2012 Bom. 101, the Bombay High Court held that the amendment will not apply unless the daughter is born after the 2005 Amendment, but on this aspect a different view has been taken in the later larger Bench judgment [AIR 214 Bom 151]. We are unable to find any reason to hold that birth of the daughter after the amendment was a necessary condition for its applicability. All that is required is that daughter should be alive and her father should also be alive on the date of the amendment.” 75. A finding has been recorded in Prakash v. Phulavati that the rights under the substituted section 6 accrue to living daughters of living coparceners as on 9.9.2005 irrespective of when such daughters are born. We find that the attention of this Court was not drawn to the aspect as to how a coparcenary is created. It is not necessary to form a coparcenary or to become a coparcener that a predecessor coparcener should be alive; relevant is birth within degrees of coparcenary to which it extends. Survivorship is the mode of succession, not that of the formation of a coparcenary. Hence, we respectfully find ourselves unable to agree with the concept of "living coparcener", as laid down in Prakash v. Phulavati. In our opinion, the daughters should be living on 9.9.2005. In substituted section 6, the expression 'daughter of a living coparcener' has not been used. Right is given under section 6(1)(a) to the daughter by birth. Declaration of right based on the past event was made on 9.9.2005 and as provided in section 6(1(b), daughters by their birth, have the same rights in the coparcenary, and they are subject to the same liabilities as provided in section 6(1)(c). Any reference to the coparcener shall include a reference to the daughter of a coparcener. The provisions of section 6(1) leave no room to entertain the proposition that coparcener should be living on 9.9.2005 through whom the daughter is claiming. We are unable to be in unison with the effect of deemed partition for the reasons mentioned in the latter part. 76. In Mangammal v. T.B. Raju & Ors. (supra), the Court considered the provisions made in the State of Tamil Nadu, the State Government enacted the Hindu Succession (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 1989, made effective from 25.3.1989, adding section 29­A in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Section 29A was held to be valid regarding succession by survivorship. Section 29A provided equal rights to daughters in coparcenary property. The provisions were more or less similar, except section 29A(iv) treated a married daughter differently. The provisions were not applicable to the daughters married before the date of commencement of Amendment Act, 1989. Thus, married daughters were not entitled to equal rights. That too, has been taken care of in section 6, as substituted by Act of 2005, and no discrimination is made against married daughters.

Result 26
Supreme Court of India
Smt. Parayankandiyal ... vs K. Devi & Ors
Honourable Judges Kuldip Singh
Date of Judgment: 26 Apr 1996
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 6
   
   
   

It should be observed that supersession (which is adhivedana in sanskrit) here means, as explained in the Mitakshara and the Subodhini, merely the contracting of a second marriage while the first wife lives; and it does not imply that the first wife is actually forsaken, or that her place is taken by the second, in respect of any matter except perhaps the husband's affection. It is true that Vijnaneswara in one place uses supersession and desertion as synonymous, but Sulpani, another high authority, uses the term in the sense given above, and Jagannatha appears to follow the latter. This view is further confirmed by the rules regarding precedence among wives, which is settled by law with a view to prevent disputes." 17. Mr. K.P. Saksena, in his Commentary on Hindu Marriage Act. 1955, 3rd Edition (1964), writes as under "According to the Hindu Jurisprudence, a husband is always permitted to marry again during the lifetime of the first wife but such marriage, if contracted without just cause, is strongly disapproved. Manu has justified the supersession of the wife and remarriage during her lifetime on the following grounds, viz.(i) barrenness, (ii) ill-health, (iii) ill-temper and misconduct of the wife, vide, manu (IX, 80-81). He further maintains that (1) the first wife is married from a sense of duty and (2) the others are regarded as married from sexual motives, vide, Manu (III, 12-13). Supersession has been explained in Mitakshara and Subodhini as a contract of second marriage while the first wife is alive and not the desertion of the wife, for in desertion she is deprived of her rights such as association in performance of religious rites, religious duties, adoption, etc. In Ranjit Las V. Bijoy Krishna, it has been held that adoption by a senior widow though lat in time is valid notwithstanding an earlier adoption by a junior widow without the consent of the senior widow whose adoption was declared to go invalid, though both wire authorized to adopt by the deceased. The Rishis do not approve of unrestricted polyagamy. They permit men to take a second wife in the lifetime of the first only under special circumstances. Thus Manu says; "A wife, who drinks any spurious liquors, who acts immorally, who shows hatred to her lord, who is incurably disease who is mischievous, who wastes his property, may at all times be superseded by another wife.

Result 27
Supreme Court of India
Ghisalal vs Dhapubai (D) By Lrs
Honourable Judges G.S. Singhvi, Asok Kumar Ganguly
Date of Judgment: 12 Jan 2011
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 9
   
   
   

By incorporating the requirement of wife's consent in the proviso to Section 7 and by conferring independent right upon a female Hindu to adopt a child, Parliament has tried to achieve one of the facets of the goal of equality enshrined in the Preamble and reflected in Article 14 read with Article 15 of the Constitution. 20. The term `consent' used in the proviso to Section 7 and the explanation appended thereto has not been defined in the Act. Therefore, while interpreting these provisions, the Court shall have to keep in view the legal position obtaining before enactment of the 1956 Act, the object of the new legislation and apply the rule of purposive interpretation and if that is done, it would be reasonable to say that the consent of wife envisaged in the proviso to Section 7 should either be in writing or reflected by an affirmative/positive act voluntarily and willingly done by her. If the adoption by a Hindu male becomes subject matter of challenge before the Court, the party supporting the adoption has to adduce evidence to prove that the same was done with the consent of his wife. This can be done either by producing document evidencing her consent in writing or by leading evidence to show that wife had actively participated in the ceremonies of adoption with an affirmative mindset to support the action of the husband to take a son or a daughter in adoption. The presence of wife as a spectator in the assembly of people who gather at the place where the ceremonies of adoption are performed cannot be treated as her consent. In other words, the Court cannot presume the consent of wife simply because she was present at the time of adoption. The wife's silence or lack of protest on her part also cannot give rise to an inference that she had consented to the adoption. 21. At this stage, we may notice some precedents which have bearing on the interpretation of proviso to Section 7 of the 1956 Act. In Kashibai v. Parwatibai (supra), this Court was called upon to consider whether in the absence of the consent of one of the two wives, the adoption by the husband could be treated valid. The facts of the case show that plaintiff No.1 and defendant No.1 were two widows of deceased Lachiram. Plaintiff No.2 was daughter of Lachiram from his first wife Kashibai and defendant No.2 was the daughter from his second wife Parwati. Defendant No.3, Purshottam son of Meena Bai and grandson of Lachiram. The plaintiffs filed suit for separate possession by partition of a double storey house, open plot and some agricultural lands. The defendants contested the suit. One of the pleas taken by them was that Purshottam son of Meena Bai had been adopted by deceased Lachiram vide registered deed of adoption dated 29.4.1970, who had also executed deed of Will in favour of the adopted son bequeathing the suit properties to him and thereby denying any right to the plaintiffs to claim partition.

Result 28
Supreme Court of India
Kalindi Damodar Garde(D) By Lrs. vs Manohar Laxman Kulkarni And Ors.
Honourable Judges L. Nageswara Rao, Hemant Gupta
Date of Judgment: 07 Feb 2020
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 2
   
   
   

5. In a suit by Kalindi, the daughter born to Laxman and Padmavati, she had taken a plea that the sons born before adoption have no right, title or interest in the properties left behind by Laxman and she being a daughter born to Laxman after his adoption would inherit the entire property along with Padmavati, her mother. Both the matters were taken up for hearing together wherein the learned Single Bench relying upon Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 19561 held that the son born before adoption is entitled to succeed to the property of their father. 6. Before this Court, Mr. Venkataramani, learned senior counsel for the appellants relied upon judgment of Division Bench of Bombay High Court reported as Kalgavda Tavanappa Patil v. Somappa Tamangavda Patil & Anr.2 wherein it has been held as under: “The son, then, begotten by an adopted Hindu before adoption has vested rights in the ancestral property of the family of his birth. Rights of property once vested cannot be taken away except in the mode or modes prescribed by Hindu Law. They cease either by death, sale, gift, degradation, disqualification or by adoption. In the case of a son whose father has been given in 1 for short, ‘Act’ 2 ILR (1909) 33 Bom 669 adoption after his birth, if none of these modes for the extinction of his vested rights of property applies, there must be the clear authority of some text for holding that the rights in question are extinguished because the father of the owner of those rights, having been given in adoption, has his rights in his natural family extinguished by the act of adoption.” 7. The argument is that the wife of an adoptee passes with her husband to the adopted family but not the sons born to an adoptee before his adoption. They continue to be members in the family in which their father was naturally born. Mr. Venkataramani, learned senior counsel for the appellants vehemently argued that the codified Hindu Law has not provided that the children born to an adoptee before adoption will be entitled to inherit the property in the adopted family, therefore, keeping in view the interpretation of Hindu Law as interpreted in Kalgavda Tavanappa Patil, the children born before adoption will not pass with the adoptee in the adopted family and are not entitled to the share in the estate of the adopted family. 8. Learned senior counsel for the appellants relied upon the following quote from the judgment in Kalgavda Tavanappa Patil: “But it is argued that when a married man is given in adoption, his wife passes with him into the adoptive family—she, like him, acquires the new gotra; that what applies to the wife of the man adopted must apply to his son also, begotten before the adoption, because, both according to the Smriti writers and their commentators, a man's wife and sons go together. In support of this argument reliance is placed on a text of Narada cited by Vijnaneshvara in his chapter on “Resumption of Gifts” in the Mitakshara (p.

Result 29
Supreme Court of India
Kasabai Tukaram Karvar vs Nivruti (Dead) Thr. Lrs.
Honourable Judges K.M. Joseph, Hrishikesh Roy
Date of Judgment: 20 Jul 2022
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 5
   
   
   

It is, in fact, the case of the plaintiff that the first defendant was the adopted son. On the said basis, the further conclusion is inevitable that on applying the doctrine of relation back, it would be deemed that as on the date of the death of their father, the first defendant was very much notionally alive and he would become the sole coparcener. It is indisputable that there can be no vacuum or break in vesting of title on the death of a person. We must further bear in mind that this is a case where succession opened up admittedly prior to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 coming into force. CA No.6076/ 2010 12. The learned counsel for the plaintiff, no doubt, relied upon Section-72 of Part-I, Chapter VI-Order of Succession to Males in the Bombay State in Mulla on Hindu Law, 23rd Edition which is reproduced below:- 72. Order of succession in cases governed by Mitakshara- The following is the order of succession to males among sapindas in the Bombay State in cases governed by Mitakshara: (1-6) Son, son's son (whose father is dead) and son's son's son (whose father and grandfather are both dead). These inherit simultaneously. Under Act XVIII of 1937, the widow, the predeceased son's widow, and the widow of a predeceased son of a predeceased son, are also recognised as heirs. xxxxxx (7) Daughter xxxxx In the Bombay State, daughter do not take as joint tenants with benefit of survivorship, but they take as tenants-in-common. Further, a daughter in that State does not take a limited estate in her father's property, but takes the property absolutely. Thus, if Hindu governed by the Bombay School dies leaving two daughters, each daughter takes an absolute interest in a moiety of her father's estate, and holds it as her separate property, and on her death her share will pass to her own heirs as her stridhana. xxxxx 13. There are other heirs but they are not being referred to. We must, in the facts of this case, proceed on the basis that the adopted son (first defendant), being a son on applying the doctrine of relation back, would exclude the daughter. This result flows from the statement that the persons in serial Nos.1 to 6, namely, son, son's son CA No.6076/ 2010 (whose father is dead) and son's son's son (whose father and grandfather are both dead) inherit simultaneously. 14. We would hold that if there is a son, the daughter would not be entitled to share along with the son. The daughter, in other words, would not be a legal heir who would take simultaneously with the son. The example which, in fact, has been set out and which we have extracted would only be applicable in a situation where there were only daughters and no son. 15. It is, undoubtedly, true that in view of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 (XVIII of 1937), the widow, inter-alia, is also recognized as an heir.

Result 30
Supreme Court of India
Shri Ram Shridhar Chimurkar vs Union Of India
Honourable Judges V. Ramasubramanian, B.V. Nagarathna
Date of Judgment: 17 Jan 2023
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 5
   
   
   

Further, Section 6 lists the requisites of a valid adoption under the said Act. Section 7 pertains to the capacity of a male Hindu to take in adoption, while Section 8 deals with the capacity of a female Hindu to adopt. Section 8 is relevant to the present case and is usefully extracted as under: “8. Capacity of a female Hindu to take in adoption.―Any female Hindu who is of sound mind and is not a minor has the capacity to take a son or daughter in adoption: Provided that, if she has a husband living, she shall not adopt a son or daughter except with the consent of her husband unless the husband has completely and finally renounced the world or has ceased to be a Hindu or has been declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be of unsound mind.” 8.3. Section 12 of HAMA Act, 1956, which is relevant to the present case, lists the effects or consequences of adoption by providing that an adopted child shall be deemed to be the child of his or her adoptive father or mother for all purposes with effect from the date of the adoption and from such date, all the ties of the child in the family of his or her birth shall be deemed to be severed and replaced by those created by the adoption in the adoptive family. The said provision is extracted as under: “12. Effects of adoption. ―An adopted child shall be deemed to be the child of his or her adoptive father or mother for all purposes with effect from the date of the adoption and from such date all the ties of the child in the family of his or her birth shall be deemed to be severed and replaced by those created by the adoption in the adoptive family: Provided that― (a) the child cannot marry any person whom he or she could not have married if he or she had continued in the family of his or her birth; (b) any property which vested in the adopted child before the adoption shall continue to vest in such person subject to the obligations, if any, attaching to the ownership of such property, including the obligation to maintain relatives in the family of his or her birth; (c) the adopted child shall not divest any person of any estate which vested in him or her before the adoption.” 8.4. However, the present case pertains not merely to a question as to the capacity of a Hindu widow to adopt, but involves issues of entitlement of a child adopted by a Hindu widow, to family pension payable to certain categories of legal heirs of a deceased government servant. It is necessary to refer to the relevant Rules of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972, as amended from time to time. Rule 3(1)(f) of the CCS (Pension) Rules defines the term ‘family pension’ in the following manner: “Family pension means `Family Pension, 1964', admissible under Rule 54 but does not include dearness relief.” Rule 54 deals, inter alia, with the amount of family pension payable, and the procedure to be followed for payment thereof.

Relevant High Court Judgments
Year From: 1950, Year To: 2024

Result 1
Delhi High Court
Ms. Teesta Chattoraj Through Her ... vs Union Of India
Honourable Judges Rajiv Sahai Endlaw
Date of Judgment: 11 May 2012
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 3
   
   
   

It is recorded in the said Deed of Adoption, that the appellant had throughout been living with her mother; that her biological father had granted total custody of the appellant to the mother and the appellant was being maintained and looked after by the mother only; that since the marriage of the mother with the adoptive father, the appellant had been residing as the daughter of the adoptive father and had been considering him only as her father; however, owing to the problems being experienced, it had been decided to formalize the adoption, in accordance with the ceremonies as well as by execution of the deed. One of the clauses of the said Adoption Deed was as under: "AND WHEREAS the natural father of the child "TEESTA" gave his consent to the First Party to give the child in Adoption if necessary for proper maintenance, welfare, upkeep, upbringing and for following proper educational permits of the child." In the said Adoption Deed, the mother was described as the First Party and the adoptive father took responsibility for the maintenance and education of the appellant and to bring up the appellant as his natural daughter according to his status in life. 6. The appellant on 26th July, 2010 applied for a passport but which was denied vide communication dated 4 th April, 2011 (supra) for the following reasons: "On scrutiny of file, it is seen that biological father's name as per birth certificate has not mentioned in the passport application form. The adoption Deed as per Adoption Act is also not valid. As per rules of Ministry of External Affairs Circular No. VI/401/01/05/2008 dated 05.10.2009 serial No. 4(2) "In the event of remarriage after divorce, the name of step-father /step-mother cannot be written in the passport of children from the previous marriage. The relationship of the child to his biological parents subsists, even after divorce by parents. It is also not possible to leave the column of father or mother blank in the passport in such cases. Therefore, such applicants must write the names of their biological parents in the application form. However, if the stepfather or stepmother is appointed by a Court as legal guardian, the name of such step-parent can be written as legal guardian". In view of the instruction, you are advised to furnish a fresh Form-1 with name of biological father or a Court Order appointing you as a Legal Guardian.

Result 2
Gujarat High Court
Khojema Saifudin Dodiya vs Registrar Of Birth And Death/ Chief ...
Honourable Judges Biren Vaishnav
Date of Judgment: 17 February 2023
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 2
   
   
   

4. The Petitioner no.1 then married the Petitioner No.2 and then adopted the son "Jems" with the consent of the families and the adoption was finalized by a deed of adoption registered on 06.09.2022. 5. Both the Petitioners then made a request to the respondent authorities to replace the name of the Petitioner No.2 in the "father's name" in place of the earlier biological father,which request was rejected by communication dated 11.10.2022 stating that the petitioners should produce an adoption decree. 6. This communication is under challenge in this Petition. C/SCA/416/2022 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 17/02/2023 Special Civil Application No.16799 of 2022 7. The Petitioner Nitesh Mangrola married Payalben on 14.02.2019. The marriage was registered on 18.06.2019. Payalben was earlier married to one Vishalbhai Pansuriya in the year 2013 and out of the wedlock they had a daughter named "Pal". On the death of the father Vishal in the year 2018, Payalben married the present Petitioner. 9. Both the Petitioner and Payalben then by way of a registered deed of adoption adopted daughter "Pal". Since they were facing difficulties in recording changes in the documents such as Passport,Bank Account etc a request was made to the authorities to change the records by substituting the name by that of the present Petitioner as "father's name" instead of Vishalbhai. The request was rejected on 11.05.2022 on the ground that a decree of a competent court was necessary. C/SCA/416/2022 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 17/02/2023 Special Civil Application No.416 of 2022. 10. Petitioner No.1 is the brother of Mustafa Dodiya who had a baby girl named "Amatulla". The Petitioners Nos.1 and 2 who are husband and wife respectively having no issues from their married life decided to adopt the minor girl from their biological parents. The petitioners with consent of families adopted the daughter after all the formalities and also by way of an adoption deed which was registered. 12. After adoption, a need arose to change the name in various records such as passport etc as the name of the father "Khojema Saiffudin Dodiya" in place of "Mustafa Saiffudin Dodiya" was to be entered into and so accordingly in the mother's name. The request was rejected by a communication dated 03.08.2019 on similar grounds hence the Petition.

Result 3
Gujarat High Court
Kiritkumar Arvindbhai Pandya vs State Of Gujarat
Honourable Judges Biren Vaishnav
Date of Judgment: 15 November 2022
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 10
   
   
   

The stage of obtaining consent, as defined under section 9 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 cannot be invoked at the stage of incorporating the father's name (adoptive) in the birth record of the son, after the divorce and adoption deeds have been registered and have not be questioned in any court of law or there is no other legal embargo and have remained uncontroveted. Thus, neither the biological father, i.e. the former husband of the petitioner no.1 is required to be made as a party to the writ proceedings for ascertaining his consent nor his opinion is necessary to be called for by the Registrar. The petitioner no.1 and 2 are happily married couple since more than five years and the adoption deed is also of 15.03.2017. 14. In such circumstances and in light of undisputed facts, the opinion of biological father is not necessary and if the same is sought for, it will create further complications and delay in make the correction. As per the provision of section 16 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, a presumption has to be drawn in favour of the petitioners since there is no rebuttal of the adoption deed of the minor 'Devam'. The Registrar, who is the competent authority under the Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969 can only verify the correction of the adoption deed and if the same is found to be duly registered and valid, he has to make necessary corrections/changes in the birth records of the adopted child. In the present case, the Registrar has not questioned the registration of the adoption deed. 15. As noticed hereinabove, the impugned communication since is premised on the circulars, which are not in existence, the same is quashed and set aside. The respondent authority is directed to correct the father's name and incorporate the name of the petitioner no.2 in the birth certificate of son 'Devam' and accordingly issue a fresh certificate. The same shall be issued within a period of 01 (one) month from C/SCA/4440/2017 ORDER DATED: 15/11/2022 the date of receipt of the present order. 16. The petition is allowed accordingly. Rule made absolute to the aforesaid extent." 6. Accordingly, the petition is allowed.

Result 4
Madras High Court
Viveknarendran vs Registrar Of Birth And Death
Honourable Judges P.T. Asha
Date of Judgment: 20 July 2020
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 6
   
   
   

Information, if given orally shall be entered by the Registrar in the appropriate reporting form and the signature or thumb impression of the informant obtained. (2) The part of the reporting form containing legal information shall be called as "Legal Part" and the part containing statistical information shall be called as "Statistical Part". (3) The information referred to in sub-rule (1) shall be given within twenty one days from the date of birth, death or still birth." It is under this amendment rules the Adoption has been incorporated http://www.judis.nic.in for the 1st time for registering births. 15. Therefore, in the case of adoption the form which is prescribed is Form 1-A. Serial Nos.4 and 5 in the said form relates to the name of the mother and father respectively. Serial Nos.7 and 8 relates to the name of the adoptive mother and the adoptive father. Therefore, the request by the petitioners to delete the name of the biological / natural father from the original birth certificate is legally not sustainable particularly when the rules clearly provides for incorporating the name of the adoptive parents separately in Column Nos. 7 and 8 as adoptive parents and not as the natural parents. 16. This Court in a Judgement reported in AIR 2013 Mad 61 - P.V.Balaji Vs. Registrar of Birth and Death, Pondicherry, had an occasion to consider a request to change the entry regarding the name of the father of the minor in the birth certificate by deleting the name contained therein and substituting the same with the name of the petitioner. The learned Judge after extracting the provisions of Article 7, http://www.judis.nic.in 8, 16 and 36 of the United Nations' Convention on Rights of Child, 1959 which has been endorsed by the Republic of India on 11.12.1992 held that the universally applied doctrine which has been adopted by India has to be applied and the rights of the child to preserve his / her identity and name has to be protected by law by removing unlawful interference. 17. The learned Judge also referred to Section 15 of the Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969 and held that the correction of entry of birth or death can be made if it is erroneous in form or substance or has been fraudulently or improperly made.

Result 5
Gujarat High Court
Chhayaben @ Hetalben Atulbhai ... vs The Registrar Of Birth And Death/Chief ...
Honourable Judges A.S. Supehia
Date of Judgment: 15 June 2022
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 10
   
   
   

The stage of obtaining consent, as defined under section 9 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 cannot be invoked at the stage of incorporating the father's name (adoptive) in the birth record of the son, after the divorce and adoption deeds have been registered and have not be questioned C/SCA/15757/2021 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 15/06/2022 in any court of law or there is no other legal embargo and have remained uncontroveted. Thus, neither the biological father, i.e. the former husband of the petitioner no.1 is required to be made as a party to the writ proceedings for ascertaining his consent nor his opinion is necessary to be called for by the Registrar. The petitioner no.1 and 2 are happily married couple since more than five years and the adoption deed is also of 15.03.2017. 14. In such circumstances and in light of undisputed facts, the opinion of biological father is not necessary and if the same is sought for, it will create further complications and delay in make the correction. As per the provision of section 16 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, a presumption has to be drawn in favour of the petitioners since there is no rebuttal of the adoption deed of the minor 'Devam'. The Registrar, who is the competent authority under the Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969 can only verify the correction of the adoption deed and if the same is found to be duly registered and valid, he has to make necessary corrections/changes in the birth records of the adopted child. In the present case, the Registrar has not questioned the registration of the adoption deed. C/SCA/15757/2021 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 15/06/2022 15. As noticed hereinabove, the impugned communication since is premised on the circulars, which are not in existence, the same is quashed and set aside. The respondent authority is directed to correct the father's name and incorporate the name of the petitioner no.2 in the birth certificate of son 'Devam' and accordingly issue a fresh certificate. The same shall be issued within a period of 01 (one) month from the date of receipt of the present order. 16. The petition is allowed accordingly. Rule made absolute to the aforesaid extent. Sd/- . (A. S. SUPEHIA, J) *** Bhavesh-[PPS]*

Result 6
Allahabad High Court
Mohammad Azam Khan And 2 Others vs State Of U.P. And 2 Others
Honourable Judges Manju Rani Chauhan
Date of Judgment: 7 February 2020
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 29
   
   
   

It's not uncommon that when a person first views his/her birth certificate, whether the original or a certified copy and if he finds that there is an error or any kind of mistake, in that cases, it's imperative that the persons is able to change or modify his birth certificate to reflect all of the pertinent details that identify who is he. 47. When for some reason, a person needs to change or modify his birth certificate including changing his age in his birth certificate or changing the date in his birth certificate, as mistakes can happen and are relatively easy to rectify, simple contacting the vital records department that was responsible for issuing the original certificate, will get him the information, the person need to proceed. 48. When it comes to changing a birth certificate after a name change or after adoption, the process is a little more involved. If the individual is under 1 year of age, a person may be able to submit paperwork allowing him to change his child's name without a court order. Each State's regulations will vary. If a person is 1 year of age and his name change is not due to marriage, he may be required to have a court order to successfully change his name. This just means he will be required to prove who he is, and in most cases he will have to include why he has decided to rename himself. 49. If the persons has been married and he is concerned about a change of birth certificate after marriage, he does not need to be as concerned. A name change due to marriage doesn't require a legal name change on his/her birth certificate. 50. Only the official issuing authority may legally make changes to a birth certificate once it's issued. Further, any alterations, more likely than not, render the certificate invalid.

Result 7
Punjab-Haryana High Court
Dr.Kamal Ahuja & Another vs Child Welfare Council Punjab
Honourable Judges G.S.Sandhawalia
Date of Judgment: 10 May 2012
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 2
   
   
   

The wife was also maintaining an NRI account No.10557362265 in the State Bank of India, Sector 17, Chandigarh branch and was currently residing in her parents house bearing No.3060, Phase VII, SAS Nagar, Mohali, Punjab. The plaintiff couple had been married for quite sometime and no child had been born out of the wed-lock and they were issueless, and therefore, wanted to adopt a child from India preferably a female child. 4. On 18.03.2008, a girl child named Rajwinder Kaur was born at Civil Hospital, Kharar, SAS Nagar, Mohali to one Mr.Balbir Singh and Mrs.Balbir Kaur aged 25 years who were residents of Mandi Kharar, Tehsil Kharar, District SAS Nagar, Mohali and the date of birth of the child was recorded with the Registrar of Birth, SAS Nagar, Mohali. The said girl child was the 5th daughter of the said couple and therefore, they, finding it difficult to properly raise and educate her, were ready to give the girl in adoption and since the plaintiffs couple were desiring for adoption of a female child, a function was organised on 27.04.2008 in the presence of respectable neighbours and according to the customary norms and rituals, the child was put in the lap of plaintiff No.2 and was adopted by the plaintiff couple in accordance with the Hindu Law and the said adoption was further witnessed by adoption deed executed by the adoptive parents vide registered deed dated 29.04.2008 in the office of the Sub-Registrar, SAS Nagar, Mohali. It was, accordingly, pleaded that in terms of the provisions of Section 17 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, the registered adoption deed was a conclusive proof of the adoption having taken place. It was further pleaded that as per the provisions of Section 14 of the Act, all the legal status was acquired by the family of the adoptive parents and the adopted child acquired all the legal rights in the family of the adoptive parents. The child was thereafter named as Hema Ahuja and public notice was also issued both in the classified column of 'Hindustan Times' and the vernacular daily of Punjabi 'Rojana Spokesman' of Chandigarh of even date.

Result 8
Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Dipali Mitra & Ors vs Coal India Limited & Ors
Honourable Judges Shekhar B. Saraf
Date of Judgment: 17 October 2023
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 22
   
   
   

Article 15(3) empowers the State to make special provisions for women and there is no reason as to why on the face of such an enabling provision, the Government should at all put in place such a restriction. Despite the marriage of a daughter, the bond of a father/mother with such married daughter is never broken; she continues to live in the heart of her parents. We are ad idem with the view expressed by the Division Bench of this Court in Soleman Bibi (supra) that "a daughter undoubtedly acquires a new relationship on marriage. She does not however lose the old relationship; she remains a daughter. Once a daughter always a daughter: qua relationship she is a daughter before, during and after marriage". We are, thus, not persuaded to hold that once married, the dependency factor altogether ceases. Proceeding on such an assumption, in our humble view, would be a misadventure. * * * 116. ... The restriction on married daughters being eligible to apply and to be considered for compassionate appointment is likely and has, in fact, given rise to a legitimate grievance in the minds of married daughters, who unfortunately are not looked after by their husbands, perforce have to take shelter in their parental/maternal home, survive on the benevolence showered by their fathers/mothers (Government employees) and owing to untimely demise of the Government employees, are left high and dry along with other members of the deceased's family who have to depend on such married daughter to feed and provide the basics to cover their body." [Emphasis Added] 19. Taking heed from such discussion regarding the distinction made between 'married' and 'unmarried' daughters, it is essential that this Court considers the twin test of reasonable classification as specified by the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal Vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar reported in (1952) 1 SCC 1 and applies the same to the distinction made under Clause 9.3.3 of NCWA-VI. The impugned Clause states that a wife, unmarried daughter, son, and legally adopted son are direct dependents eligible for seeking compassionate appointment. The common ground between all direct dependents for such grouping, seems to be that it is assumed that such individuals are 'dependents of the deceased' who may suffer immediate financial crisis upon the death of the sole-breadwinner.

Result 9
Allahabad High Court
Smt. Vimla Srivastava vs State Of U.P. And Another
Honourable Judges Yashwant Varma
Date of Judgment: 4 December 2015
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 4
   
   
   

After the marriage, her husband is not only her guardian but he is under legal obligation to maintain her. Under the Hindu Law, after the marriage, the daughter even does not remain member of the family of her father and she becomes member of her in laws family." Moreover, it has been submitted that a married daughter is not considered as a dependent of her deceased father and is not legally entitled to get compassionate appointment. In support of the submissions which have been urged in the counter affidavit, learned Standing Counsel submits that Rule 2 (c) has made no discrimination on grounds of gender. The submission is that the purpose of Rule 2 (c) is to enable the State to grant compassionate appointment to a member of the family who was dependent on the deceased government servant. When a daughter is married, it is asserted, the element of dependency on the deceased government servant ceases to exist and the reason for the exclusion is not gender but the absence of dependency. While assessing the rival submissions, it must be noted at the outset that the definition of the expression "family" in Rule 2 (c) incorporates the categories of heirs of a deceased government servant. Among them are the wife or husband, sons and adopted sons, unmarried daughters, unmarried adopted daughters, widowed daughters and widowed daughters-in-law. Clause (ii) of Rule 2 (c) brings a son as well as an adopted son within the purview of the expression "family" irrespective of marital status. A son who is married continues to be within the ambit of the expression "family" for the purpose of Rule 2 (c). But by the stroke of a legislative definition, a daughter who is married is excluded from the scope and purview of the family of a deceased government servant unless she falls within the category of a widowed daughter. The invidious discrimination that is inherent in Rule 2 (c) lies in the fact that a daughter by reason of her marriage is excluded from the ambit of the expression "family". Her exclusion operates by reason of marriage and, whether or not she was at the time of the death of the deceased government servant dependent on him. Marriage does not exclude a son from the ambit of the expression "family". But marriage excludes a daughter. This is invidious.

Result 10
Madras High Court
Viveknarendran vs Registrar Of Birth And Death
Honourable Judges P.T. Asha
Date of Judgment: 20 July 2020
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 3
   
   
   

The learned counsel during her arguments had also submitted that necessary directions be issued to the Authorities under the registration of births and deaths for correcting the birth certificate of the minor child, by entering the name of the 1st petitioner as the father of the minor child by deleting the name of V.Venkatesh who has been registered as the father in the original birth certificate of the minor child. http://www.judis.nic.in 7. Heard the learned counsel and perused the papers. 8. It is an admitted fact and proved by documents, namely, Ex.P.3 that the biological / natural father of the minor Sahaana, one V.Venkatesh had died on 15.05.2017. Therefore, it is amply evident that it is only the 2nd petitioner who is the surviving parent of the minor. The parties to the proceedings are all Hindus and therefore bound by the provisions of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. Section 9 of the above Act describes the persons who are capable of giving in adoption. Sections 9 (1) & (2) would clearly imply that during the life time of one of the spouse the other cannot give in adoption except with the consent of the other, unless one of them has completely and finally renounced the world or has ceased to be a Hindu or has been declared by a Court of competent jurisdiction to be of an unsound mind. 9. In the instant case the biological / natural father died 3 years ago and therefore the proviso to Section 9 (2) of the Act would not be applicable in the instant case. It is therefore well open to the 2nd http://www.judis.nic.in petitioner, the biological / natural mother to giver her minor child in adoption to the 1st petitioner. Further, the 1st and 2nd petitioner are now husband and wife and the records would indicate that the minor is living along with the petitioners and she appears to be well taken care of. Therefore, there is no impediment to grant the first relief sought for in the petition. 10. As regards the second relief as prayed for by the learned counsel for the petitioners, it cannot be granted for the simple reason that the said late V.Venkatesh was the biological / natural father of minor Sahanaa and on the date on which the birth certificate was issued by the Authorities the said Venkatesh was very much alive and it is he who has been described as the father of the minor child in the birth certificate issued by the Authorities.

Result 11
Karnataka High Court
Siddaramappa And Ors. vs Smt. Gouravva
Honourable Judges N. Kumar
Date of Judgment: 9 December 2003
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 8
   
   
   

14. A reading of the aforesaid Section 7 makes it very clear that any male Hindu who is of sound mind and is not a minor has the capacity to take a son or a daughter in adoption. But, the proviso to that section makes it very clear if that male has a wife living, shall not adopt except with the consent of his wife; unless the wife (a) has completely and finally renounced the world (b) has ceased to be a Hindu or (c) has been declared by a Court of competent jurisdiction to be of unsound mind. Therefore, the proviso makes it very clear under what circumstances in spite of a wife living a male Hindu is competent to adopt a child without her consent. Having regard to the language employed in the said proviso, the said proviso is exhaustive. The law does not provide for any other contingency under which a male Hindu can adopt a child without the consent of his wife living at the time of adoption. When the circumstances under which a consent of wife is not necessary are specified, they cannot be added to. To do that would be adding words to the statute. More over the words in the proviso that "he shall not adopt except with the consent of his wife" is emphatic and renders the provision mandatory and should be obeyed if the adoption to be lawful. The reason is obvious. Adoption is the admission of a stranger by birth to the privileges of a child as if the said child was born to the adoptive parents. With the adoption the child takes birth to the adoptive parents and acquires interest in the property belonging to the adoptive parents. Thus, the adoption affects the rights of a Hindu wife in the property of her husband. When a wife gives birth to a child whether she likes the child or not, law recognizes her as the mother of the said child and the said child as the son or daughter of the said wife. For recognizing this relationship consent, concurrence of the mother is not required. But, if a stranger by birth has to be conferred with the privileges of a child of the said wife the consent of the wife is a must. No child could be foisted against such a wife by her husband without her consent and against her wish. In other words she cannot be compelled to recognize a stranger by birth as her child and she as the mother of the said child. More so, when such adoption affects her absolute right to the property of her husband.

Result 12
Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Dipali Mitra & Ors vs Coal India Limited & Ors
Honourable Judges Shekhar B. Saraf
Date of Judgment: 17 October 2023
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 25
   
   
   

There may be many other probabilities in which a married daughter may be fully dependent upon the income of her father so that death of the father would leave her and the rest of the members of the family in extreme economic hardship. Why should then a distinction be made between a son and a married daughter? An unemployed married son according to the rules is eligible but an unemployed married daughter is ineligible irrespective of the fact that they are or may be similarly placed and equally distressed financially by the death of the rather. Take the case of a teacher who died-in-harness leaving him surviving his illiterate widow, an unqualified married son and a qualified married daughter who were all dependent on the income of the deceased. Following the rule as it is interpreted by the Council and its learned advocate, this family cannot be helped. Is this the intended result of the rule? Or does this interpretation advance the object of the rule? What is the basis for the qualification which debars the married daughter? And what is the nexus between the qualification and the object sought to be achieved? In my view, there is none. If any one suggests that a son married or unmarried would look after the parent and his brothers and sisters, and that a married sister would not do as much, my answer will be that experience has been otherwise. Not only that the experience has been otherwise but also judicial notice has been taken thereof by a Court no less than the Apex Court in the case of Savita v. Union of India reported in (1996) 2 SCC 380 wherein Their Lordships quoted with approval a common saying; 'A son is a son until he gets a wife. A daughter is a daughter throughout her life'." [Emphasis Added] 23. Finally, this Court in the order dated November 28, 2019, of the unreported judgement of Sulekha Gorain Vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors. (MANU/WB/2038/2019) relied on State of West Bengal & Ors. Vs. Purnima Das & Ors. (supra) to prove that such a distinction between 'married' and 'unmarried' daughter for the purpose of an amendment made to the West Bengal Public Distribution System (Maintenance and Control) Order, 2003 is in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Result 13
Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
The State Of West Bengal & Ors vs Purnima Das & Ors
Honourable Judges Dipankar Datta
Date of Judgment: 13 September 2017
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 49
   
   
   

She may have been an abandoned wife again fully dependent upon the father. She may have been married to an indigent husband so that both the married daughter and the son-in-law would have been dependent upon the income of the bread winner whose death led them to extreme financial hardship. The concept of a 'Ghar Jamai' (one who lives at one's father-in-law's house) is well accepted in Indian society particularly in those families where there is no son. There may be many other probabilities in which a married daughter may be fully dependent upon the income of her father so that death of the father would leave her and the rest of the members of the family in extreme economic hardship. Why should then a distinction be made between a son and a married daughter? An unemployed married son according to the rules is eligible but an unemployed married daughter is ineligible irrespective of the fact that they are or may be similarly placed and equally distressed financially by the death of the father. Take the case of a teacher who died-in-harness leaving him surviving his illiterate widow, an unqualified married son and a qualified married daughter who were all dependent on the income of the deceased. Following the rule as it is interpreted by the Council and its learned Advocate, this family cannot be helped. Is this the intended result of the rule? Or does this interpretation advance the object of the rule? What is the basis for the qualification which debars the married daughter? And what is the nexus between the qualification and the object sought to be achieved? In my view, there is none. If any one suggests that a son married or unmarried would look after the parent and his brothers and sisters and that a married sister would not do as much, my answer will be that experience has been otherwise. Not only that the experience has been otherwise but also judicial notice has been taken thereof by a Court no less than the Apex Court in the case of Savita v. Union of India reported in (1996) 2 SCC 380 wherein Their Lordships quoted with approval a common saying : 'A son is a son until he gets a wife. A daughter is a daughter throughout her life'." Without hesitation, we concur with whatever has been expressed in the aforesaid excerpt.

Result 14
Bombay High Court
Venubai Wd/O Wasudeo Rambhad (Since ... vs Laxman Lahanuji Rambhad (Since Dead ...
Honourable Judges B.P. Dharmadhikari
Date of Judgment: 18 January 2008
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 6
   
   
   

The perusal of judgment of this Court in the case of Bhagirathibai v. Dwarkabai, again shows that such a right of daughter-in-law against ancestral property or self acquired property of her father in-law under uncodified law is also recognized by the High Court but with a rider added that such self acquired property should not have been disposed of by father-in-law by way of gift. If it was not so disposed of, the right was held to be available against such self acquired property inherited by heirs of father-in-law also. This rider recognised by this High Court is not accepted to be correct in para 65 & 66 of its judgement by Hon. Andhra Pradesh High Court. But then these rulings do not support the stand of Appellant that even under codified law the widowed daughter in law has such entitlement. The contention that Full Bench has not followed Bombay decision is therefore not relevant for deciding the controversy before me. In any case, in present matter, the husband of Venubai by name Wasudeo has expired on 7.8.1976 i.e. well after coming into force the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. 9. The reliance by Shri Deopujari, learned Counsel for the appellants on judgment of Hon.ble Punjab & Haryana High Court Balbir Kaur v. Harinder Kaur, (supra) to show that right of maintenance under Section 19 includes provision for residence and widowed daughter in law is entitled to claim right of maintenance against self acquired property of father-in-law in his hand or in the hands of his heirs under Section 19 of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, now needs to be considered. The Hon. Single Judge there has in para 14 observed that: 14. Section 19 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') deals with the right of maintenance of a widowed daughter-in-law. Whether married before or after the commencement of the Act, she can claim maintenance only if she is unable to maintain herself from her own sources or out of the estate of her husband or her father or mother or from her son or daughter, if any, or his or her estate. The right to claim maintenance from the father-in-law, in the circumstances stated above, is however conditional upon the father-in-law having in possession of coparcenary property out of which widowed daughter-in-law has not obtained any share.

Result 15
Karnataka High Court
Basavaraj Alias Shivabasappa S/O ... vs Saraswathi W/O Sharanappa Mankar
Date of Judgment: 13 April 2023
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 6
   
   
   

The rights of a second wife on her husband's property, if found to be in contravention of "Marriage Act, 1955", is no more res integra. Though a wife is entitled to succeed to the estate of her husband under "Succession Act, 1956", there are several nuances involved. If the husband remarries during subsistence of first marriage, the rights of a second wife can be challenged, if they do not meet the legal criteria. To determine the rights of a second wife, we must first examine the legality of second marriage. The "Marriage Act, 1955" prohibits bigamy. The Act specifies that, at the time of second marriage, none of the parties should be legally married and both the parties must end their previous marriage so as to remarry. Therefore, if this condition is not met, the second wife does not have a right to claim any share in the property of a husband. Therefore, if husband's remarries without ending the previous marriage and first wife is alive when the second marriage is contracted by husband, a second wife post codification will not acquire a status of a wife or a widow. As per "Marriage Act, 1955", remarriage without legal culmination of the first marriage is illegal. If marriage is illegal, the second wife will not acquire a status of a wife or a widow. Therefore, a second wife will not inherit the property rights nor she is competent to give consent under "Adoptions Act, 1956". 18. The usage of the expression "may" in Section 5 of the "Marriage Act, 1955" does not make the provision of Section 5 optional. Section 5 in positive terms indicates that a marriage can be solemnised between two Hindus only if the conditions are fulfilled. Under Sections 5 and 11 of the "Marriage Act, 1955" a second marriage with a previous married wife living is null and void. If marriage of the plaintiff in the present case on hand is null and void, both the Courts erred in entertaining the plaintiff's suit. 19. The wordings found in Section 10 of the "Succession Act, 1956" that in the event there are more widows than one, all the widows together shall take one share refers to the marriages solemnised before codification of Hindu Law. Therefore, a female, whose marriage is void-de-jure and surviving the death of her husband, would not be covered by the term widow either in Class-I of Schedule or anywhere such a reference occurs in all the Acts.

Result 16
Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Priyanka Shrimali vs State Of Rajasthan
Honourable Judges Sandeep Mehta, Vijay Bishnoi, Arun Bhansali
Date of Judgment: 13 September 2022
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 18
   
   
   

Implicit in the definition which has been adopted by the state in Rule 2(c) is an assumption that while a son continues to be a member of the family and that upon marriage, he does not cease to be a part of the family of his father, a daughter upon marriage ceases to be a part of the family of her father. It is discriminatory and constitutionally impermissible for the State to make that assumption and to use marriage as a rationale for practicing an act of hostile discrimination by denying benefits to a daughter when equivalent benefits are granted to a son in terms of compassionate appointment. Marriage does not determine the continuance of the relationship of a child, whether a son or a daughter, with the parents. A son continues to be a son both before and after marriage. A daughter continues to be a daughter. This relationship is not effaced either in fact or in law upon marriage. Marriage does not bring about a severance of the relationship between a father and mother and their son or between parents and their daughter. These relationships are not governed or defined by marital status. The State has based its defence in its reply and the foundation of the exclusion on a paternalistic notion of the role and status of a woman. These patriarchal notions must answer the test of the guarantee of equality under Article 14 and must be (24 of 33) held answerable to the recognition of gender identity under Article 15. The stand which has been taken by the state in the counter affidavit proceeds on a paternalistic notion of the position of a woman in our society and particularly of the position of a daughter after marriage. The affidavit postulates that after marriage, a daughter becomes a member of the family of her husband and the responsibility for her maintenance solely lies upon her husband. The second basis which has been indicated in the affidavit is that in Hindu Law, a married daughter cannot be considered as dependent of her father or a dependent of a joint Hindu family. The assumption that after marriage, a daughter cannot be said to be a member of the family of her father or that she ceases to be dependent on her father irrespective of social circumstances cannot be countenanced. Our society is governed by constitutional principles.

Result 17
Chattisgarh High Court
Loknath Died Through Lrs. Shribachahh ... vs Sindhu
Honourable Judges Sanjay K. Agrawal
Date of Judgment: 28 June 2021
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 12
   
   
   

32. Thus, according to Section 6 of the Act of 1856, in case of remarriage, all the formalities for marriage are required to be proved. Section 6 of the Act contemplates the performance of almost the same ceremonies, which are required in the case of the marriage of Hindu female. In order to prove the remarriage, performance of all the ceremonies will have to be done in her remarriage. There can be no valid marriage in any form without a substantial performance of the requisite religious ceremonies. The performance of ceremonies, therefore, is necessary for the completion of the marriage. The effect of the valid remarriage is the widow losing her right in the property inherited from the previous husband. Therefore, where remarriage is set up as defence, it has to be strictly proved looking to devastating consequence to be befallen upon widow in shape of depriving her right to property. 33. Reverting to the facts of the present case, finally, in the light of the aforesaid proposition, it would be apparent that in order to prove the fact of remarriage, the plaintiff (PW-1) in his statement in para 1 has simply stated that after marriage of defendant No.2, defendant No.1 has remarried some one else and left the village and in para 6 of his cross-examination, he was not able to even tell the name of person whom defendant No.1 has remarried and he has also clearly stated that he had not seen defendant No.1 remarrying in chudi form and even failed to state the date and year when Kiya Bai - defendant No.1 remarried in chudi form. Janardan (PW-2) has stated that defendant No.1 absconded with one Gumpatiya Baba, but in cross-examination he has failed to state particulars about the marriage and failed to state about the marriage of defendant No.1 with that person (Baba). Likewise, Khaju (PW-3), who is a hearsay witness, has clearly stated that he was informed by the villagers that Kiya Bai had remarried someone else and has left the village, but he also failed to clearly state about the particulars of marriage and about the person with whom Kiya Bai is said to have performed second marriage.

Result 18
Kerala High Court
Fathima Abdul Kareem vs State Of Kerala
Honourable Judges V.Giri
Date of Judgment: 11 December 2008
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 2
   
   
   

The State Government does not purport to interfere with the power of the competent authority under the Passport Act. Reference is made to Clause 7 Ext.R1(a), which reads as follows: "7. CHANGE OF NAME:- 1. Following marriage : Remarriage divorce: (a) A woman applying for first time for a passport in her married name for change of name/surname in existing passport on account of marriage OR for substitution of father's name with husband's name, must furnish an attested copy of marriage certificate issued by Registrar of Marriages OR an affidavit from the husband and wife. (b) Divorcees applying for change of name OR for substitution of husband's name with father's name in existing passport must furnish: (i) Divorce deed duly authenticated by court: OR (ii)Deed poll/sworn affidavits (Annexure 'A') W.P.(C).NO.33729/08& 34730/08 :: 4 :: (c) Re-married ladies applying for4 change of name/husband's name must furnish: (i) Divorce deed/death certificate as the case may be in respect of her first husband, and (ii)Documents as at (a) above relating to second marriage." 5. Authentication of divorce by competent court is one of the methods of proving a divorce or even the existence of a re-marriage. But it is not the only method. Divorce resultant upon a 'talak' pronounced by her husband is a mode of divorce that is accepted in the Muslim Community. An affirmation of the state of affairs by a sworn affidavit in the form 'Annexure A' would suffice going by Clause 7 of Ext.R1(a). It is affirmed that State Government does not propose to make any addition to what is already mentioned as due procedure under Ext.R1(a). 6. Having heard Learned counsel for the petitioners and learned Government Pleader and the learned Assistant Solicitor General, I am of the view that, in these circumstances, the concerned passport officer may proceed to issue a passport, as sought for by the petitioners with the corrections as sought for by them, provided they W.P.(C).NO.33729/08& 34730/08 :: 5 :: comply with the procedural formalities stipulated in Ext.R1(a). This shall be done within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. Writ petitions are disposed of as above. Sd/- (V.GIRI) JUDGE sk/ //true copy//

Result 19
Delhi High Court
Lt. Gen. Y. K. Mehta vs Lt. Gen. R. K. Mehta And Ors.
Honourable Judges Neena Bansal Krishna
Date of Judgment: 5 December 2023
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 30
   
   
   

It was observed that the documents such as the Secondary School Leaving Certificate, applications filed by the child for getting B.C. Scholarship, community certificate issued in his favour, passport, income tax certificate and sale deeds executed wherein he was described as the son of Krishnan Chettiar (alleged adoptive father) would not prove the adoption merely because he was described as the son of Krishnan Chettiar. It was further observed that the same may be used as corroborative evidence only when the adoption has been proved to the satisfaction of the court. 97. Likewise, in the case of Lalitha Vs. Parameshwari Alias Ramabai and Ors. AIR 2001 Mad 363, the Division Bench of the Madras High Court held that in the invitation card printed for the puberty function, celebration of the marriage of the plaintiff and the school certificate, the name of an individual finds a place as the father of the plaintiff, would not establish that the plaintiff was adopted by such person. 98. Similarly, in the present case, even though the name of the step father came to be reflected as the father of two girls, cannot lead to any inference of adoption especially in the absence of any cogent evidence to even hint that the ceremony of "giving and taking" of the two girls had ever taken place. 99. Ms. Archana Sood in her cross-examination admitted that her official documents such as PAN Card, Passport, income tax returns had the name of Maj Gen Surjit Singh€Ÿs as her father. She explained that she mentioned her father's name as Major General Surjit Singh in all public documents since her mother got remarried to him and as he is her stepfather. 100. The most material witness to the factum of adoption was Mrs. Neelam Singh the mother of the two girls namely, Ms. Gregory Simran and Ms. Archana Sood, who appeared as PW2 (in CS OS 579/2022) and DW1 in (CS OS No. 579/2022). She deposed that on the demise of her husband Flt Lt. Yoginder Kumar Mehta, she got married to Major General Surjit Singh in the year 1981 who had two sons namely Captain Sandeep Singh and Shri. Paramjit Singh from his first wife. She categorically denied having given the two girls ever in adoption to her second husband Major General Surjit Singh.

Result 20
Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
The State Of West Bengal & Ors vs Purnima Das & Ors
Honourable Judges Dipankar Datta
Date of Judgment: 13 September 2017
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 48
   
   
   

Despite the marriage of a daughter, the bond of a father/mother with such married daughter is never broken; she continues to live in the heart of her parents. We are ad idem with the view expressed by the Division Bench of this Court in Soleman Bibi (supra) that "a daughter undoubtedly acquires a new relationship on marriage. She does not however lose the old relationship; she remains a daughter. Once a daughter always a daughter: qua relationship she is a daughter before, during and after marriage". We are, thus, not persuaded to hold that once married, the dependency factor altogether ceases. Proceeding on such an assumption, in our humble view, would be a misadventure. 107. It is now time to consider the decisions of the high courts holding that exclusion of 'married daughters' from the purview of compassionate appointment offends the Constitution. Mr. Mitra and Mr. Mondal have placed reliance on the decisions in Usha Singh (supra), Medha Prashant Parkhe (supra), Chitra Mali (Mondal) (supra), Sou. Swara Sachin Kulkarni (supra) and Smt. Vimla Srivastava (supra), amongst others. 108. The decision in Usha Singh (supra) is the first decision that has been cited on behalf of Arpita and Kakali. Paragraph 10 of such decision has been quoted with approval in Medha Prashant Parkhe (supra). The Division Bench of this Court in Chitra Mali (Mondal) (supra) has also upheld the ratio of such decision, although the same was not applied. In Sou. Swara Sachin Kulkarni (supra), the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court addressed the problem viewing it from the same angle without, however, referring to Usha Singh (supra). 109. The relevant paragraph from the decision in Usha Singh (supra) reads as follows: "10. The rationale of the rules quoted hereinabove in that the son or the daughter who applies for an appointment in the died-in-harness category should have been dependent upon the income of the deceased so that his untimely death left him/her/them in extreme economic hardship. The Avowed object of the rules is to provide relief to the family which is in extreme financial hardship and for this purpose an unemployed son can apply whether married or unmarried. Why then is the restriction upon a daughter that she should be unmarried in order to be eligible for appointment? A married daughter can be a divorcee fully dependent upon the father.

Result 21
Allahabad High Court
Bhanu Pratap Singh vs State Of U.P. And 2 Others
Date of Judgment: 25 November 2020
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 14
   
   
   

Nevertheless the trial court analysed the material and evidence on record and came to the conclusion that Mishri Bai was living like a divorced woman. 12. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand submitted that admittedly Mishri Bai did not fall into any of the enumerated categories contained in Section 8 of the Act and, therefore, she could not have validly taken Brajendra Singh in adoption. 13. It is to be noted that in the suit there was no declaration sought for by Mishri Bai either to the effect that she was not married or that the marriage was sham or that there was any divorce. The stand was that Mishri Bai and her husband were living separately for a very long period. 14. Section 8 of the Act reads as follows: "8. Capacity of a female Hindu to take in adoption.--Any female Hindu-- (a) who is of sound mind, (b) who is not minor, and (c) who is not married, or if married, whose marriage has been dissolved or whose husband is dead or has completely and finally renounced the world or has ceased to be a Hindu or has been declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be of unsound mind, has capacity to take a son or daughter in adoption." 15. We are concerned in the present case with clause (c) of Section 8. The section brings about a very important and far-reaching change in the law of adoption as used to apply earlier in case of Hindus. It is now permissible for a female Hindu who is of sound mind and has completed the age of 18 years to take a son or daughter in adoption to herself in her own right provided that (a) she is not married; (b) or is a widow; (c) or is a divorcee or after marriage her husband has finally renounced the world or is ceased to be a Hindu or has been declared to be of unsound mind by a court having jurisdiction to pass a declaratory decree to that effect. It follows from clause (c) of Section 8 that Hindu wife cannot adopt a son or daughter to herself even with the consent of her husband because the section expressly provides for cases in which she can adopt a son or daughter to herself during the lifetime of the husband. She can only make an adoption in the cases indicated in clause (c). 16. It is important to note that Section 6(i) of the Act requires that the person who wants to adopt a son or a daughter must have the capacity and also the right to take in adoption.

Result 22
Madras High Court
P.S.Amirthavalli vs The District Collector
Honourable Judges Pushpa Sathyanarayana
Date of Judgment: 8 December 2020
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 2
   
   
   

Therefore, the petitioner is entitled to claim the death benefits of her daughter-in-law and the assets owned by her as per Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act. http://www.judis.nic.in 5. It is stated that the deceased Malini did not have the father and mother. Even presuming that the parents of the said Malini were to be alive, in the orders specified in Section 15(1)(a) of the Act, they come only after the heirs of the husband. 6. As the petitioner is the legal heir of the husband of the deceased, the parents of the deceased will come only after that. As stated supra, the Tahsildar, Mambalam Taluk has issued the legal heirship certificate for the death of the son of the petitioner P.S.Devanathan, after due enquiry. However, when the petitioner applied for the legal heirship certificate for the death of the daughter- in-law, the respondents directed her to go before the Civil Court to get heirship declared. 7. In the meanwhile, the learned Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents, upon instructions, states that on 02.12.2020, the Tahisildar, Thirukazhukundram, who is the second respondent, had passed an order, stating that the petitioner is the Class-II legal heir and hence, the legal heirship certificate cannot be issued and that the petitioner has to approach the Civil Court. http://www.judis.nic.in 8. In order to decide who are the legal heirs of a female Hindu under category (b) of Section 15 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act, it is not necessary to go back to the date of the death of the husband, to ascertain, who were the heirs at that time. Unfortunately, in this case, the husband, wife and child perished on the same date. Therefore, the succession for both the husband and the wife opened on the same date. Her heirs under Section 15(1)(b) will have to be ascertained, as the succession to her husband had opened already at the time of her death. 9. The devolution upon the heirs of the husband of the female intestate shall be in the same order and according to the same Rules, as would have applied, if the property belonged to the husband and had died intestate in respect thereof immediately after her death. Unless it is established that there are other heirs specified in Section 15(1)(a), all her property will devolve upon the heirs of the husband, as heirs specified therein.

Result 23
Bombay High Court
Shri. Rajendra Mahadeo Deokule vs Smt. Suvarna Mahadeo Deokule
Honourable Judges K.K. Tated, B.P.Colabawalla
Date of Judgment: 3 April 2018
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 8
   
   
   

Section 21 reads thus- "21. Dependants defined.--For the purposes of this Chapter "dependants" mean the following relatives of the deceased-- (i) his or her father; (ii) his or her mother; Pg 10 of 20 reserved.cam.25.2017 (Colabawalla).april.18.doc (iii) his widow, so long as she does not remarry; (iv) his or her son or the son of his predeceased son or the son of a predeceased son of his predeceased son, so long as he is a minor; provided and to the extent that he is unable to obtain maintenance, in the case of a grandson from his father's or mother's estate, and in the case of a great- grandson, from the estate of his father or mother or father's father or father's mother; (v) his or her unmarried daughter for the unmarried daughter of his predeceased son or the unmarried daughter of a predeceased son of his predeceased son, so long as she remains unmarried; provided and to the extent that she is unable to obtain maintenance, in the case of a granddaughter from her father's or mother's estate and in the case of a great-granddaughter from the estate of her father or mother or father's father or father's mother; (vi) his widowed daughter; provided and to the extent that she is unable to obtain maintenance-- (a) from the estate of her husband; or (b) from her son or daughter, if any, or his or her estate; or (c) from her father-in-law or his father or the estate of either of them; (vii) any widow of his son or of a son of his predeceased son, so long as she does not remarry; provided and to the extent that she is unable to obtain maintenance from her husband's estate, or from her son or daughter, if any, or his or her estate; or in the case of a grandson's widow, also from her father-in-law's estate; (viii) his or her minor illegitimate son, so long as he remains a minor; (ix) his or her illegitimate daughter, so long as she remains unmarried." 11. On a harmonious reading of Section 26 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 with Sections 20 and 21 of the Hindu Adoptions Pg 11 of 20 reserved.cam.25.2017 (Colabawalla).april.18.doc and Maintenance Act, 1956, at least prima facie we are unimpressed with the arguments canvassed by Mr Hegde.

Result 24
Bombay High Court
Shri. Joseph Isharat vs Mrs. Rosy Nishikant Gaikwad
Honourable Judges S.C. Gupte
Date of Judgment: 1 March 2017
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 8
   
   
   

It is submitted that even under the law as it stood prior to its amendment in 2016, the Plaintiff being an unmarried daughter of the Defendant, the purchase made by the Defendant in her name is excepted from the prohibition of benami transactions within the meaning of Section 3 of the Benami Act, as it then stood. This argument has two aspects. One, whether the Plaintiff was married as on the date of the suit transaction, that is to say, as on the date of the purchase of the suit property, her marriage with Ghoderao being null and void and non-est on account of Ghoderao being already married. And second, as far as the expression "daughter" is concerned, whether a step-daughter is included in it independent of the definition "child" in the Income Tax Act, 1961 (since that was not the mandate of the law at the relevant date). Though the first This Order is modified/corrected by Speaking to Minutes Order dated 30/03/2017 sa 749-2015.doc point is debatable, I am willing to concede that the Plaintiff was not married on the date of the purchase by the Defendant. The real difficulty arises on the second aspect. What we have to consider here is, whether the expression "daughter" as understood by the Benami Act, as it then stood, takes within its sweep a step-child. By ordinary connotation, and also having regard to the provisions of the Benami Act and applying the rule of purposive interpretation, the expression would ordinarily take within its fold only a natural born daughter as also an adopted daughter. There is no scope for including a step-daughter within its meaning. It is not in dispute that the Plaintiff did not qualify either as a natural daughter or an adopted daughter of the Defendant. 10 Mr.Pungalia, however, refers to the definition of 'daughter' in Black's Law Dictionary. He also relies on a decision in the case of Murphy vs. Ingram5 and a Division Bench of our court in the case of Shaikh Ahmed Shaikh Mohamed Ashraf vs. Bai Fatma 6. Black's Law Dictionary defines "daughter" as a parent's female child; female child in a parent-child relationship. This decision would take within its hold only natural born or adoptive daughter. The decision of Murphy vs. Ingram has no bearing on the controversy before us.

Result 25
Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Putul Rabidas vs Eastern Coalfields Ltd. & Ors
Honourable Judges Dipankar Datta, Tapabrata Chakraborty
Date of Judgment: 13 September 2017
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 11
   
   
   

The question is what is the meaning of that qualification. Does it exclude daughters once, but no longer, married? I think not. It appears to me that the important portion of the context to read in connexion with the definition is the operative part of S. 8 which provides for one payment to be distributed at a special time or period - the death of the employee - among particular persons. According to the English authorities and also I think in common conversation, when 'unmarried' forms a qualification in the description of a person who is to receive a sum of money at a definite time or period, the meaning 'not married' appears to be appropriate: see Leshingham Trust 24 Ch. D. 703 and Jarman on Wills in particular at p. 1252. For these reasons I agree with the decision in 13 Lah 228 (1) and construe the expression 'unmarried aughter' (sic daughter) in S. 2, 1(d) of the Act as including widowed daughter." 42. The aforesaid decision was noticed by another Division Bench of this Court in its decision reported in AIR 1963 Calcutta 428 [Mina Rani Majumdar v. Dasarath Majumdar]. The Division Bench was considering whether an application for maintenance under section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 was maintainable despite a petition under section 13 of that Act claiming a decree of divorce had been dismissed. While construing the word "unmarried" in section 25(1) of the 1955 Act, as it stood prior to its omission by Act 68 of 1976 with effect from May 27, 1976, Hon'ble Justice R.S. Bachawat (as His Lordship then was) observed that the word "unmarried" has several meanings and an interesting discussion is found in Soleman Bibi (supra). The popular meaning of the word, according to His Lordship, is "never having been married" and the dictionary meaning is "not married". Having regard to section 25(1), the Bench was of the opinion that "unmarried" in the context cannot mean "never having been married" because the applicant must have been a husband or a wife and, therefore, must have been married; nor can it mean "not married" for an order under section 25 may be passed in favour of a married woman on the passing of a decree of judicial separation or for restitution of conjugal rights. In the context of section 25(1), His Lordship held that the word means "not remarried".

Result 26
Madras High Court
Muthammal (Died) vs V.Pavunambal
Honourable Judges M.Venugopal
Date of Judgment: 9 April 2012
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 22
   
   
   

54.According to the Learned Counsel for the Appellants/ Defendants that the right to claim maintenance by the 1st Respondent/ 1st Plaintiff against the 1st Defendant [deceased Father-in-Law] is conditional upon the Father-in-Law being in possession of a coparcenary property out of which the 1st Respondent/1st Plaintiff [widowed daughter-in-law] has not obtained any share. 55.As a matter of fact, Section 19 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 must be read with Section 22 which pertains to the right of the dependants of a deceased person to claim maintenance from heirs who have inherited his estate by Will. Moreover, as per Section 21 (vii) of the Act, the widowed daughter-in-law is one of the dependants of a deceased Hindu. 56.The Learned Counsel for the Appellants/Defendants submits that Section 21(vi) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 specifies that a widowed daughter of the deceased is a dependant, to the extent that she is unable to get maintenance from her husband's estate, or from her son or daughter or their estate; or her Father-in-Law or his father; or the estate of either of them and for this purpose she is a dependant of the deceased. 57.The Learned Counsel for the Appellants/Defendants contends that when once the husband dies as per Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act on the death of a coparcener, there shall be a deemed division of the property to which such coparcener is entitled, as if a partition has taken place and a notional partition and division has been introduced by means of a deeming fiction. 58.At this stage, this Court points out that the obligation of a Father-in-Law to maintain his daughter-in-law arises only on the death of the husband and such an obligation can also be met from the properties in which the husband is a co-sharer. 59.As per Section 21 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 the widowed daughter-in-law is the dependant of her Father-in-Law and the father of the Father-in-Law as per Clause 7 of Section 21 in certain given situations. 60.Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 deals with General rules of succession in the case of males. Whether a male Hindu has died intestate, the property shall firstly devolve upon the heirs specified in Class I of the Schedule.

Result 27
Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Ch. Damayanthi, vs Apsrtc
Honourable Judges Battu Devanand
Date of Judgment: 26 February 2021
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 11
   
   
   

The daughters have all the rights, which are available to sons, be it succession, right(s) in property etc. and these rights don't cease with marriage of a daughter and remain alive even after marriage. In fact, marriage is a social circumstance and it does not affect the dependency, thus marriage cannot be regarded as a reasonable and acceptable ground to determine dependency. For dependency (herein financial dependency), many facets have to be looked into, one of them is a situation where a son is not in need of compassionate appointment, but a married daughter is in need of the same, then the State cannot shrug off from its responsibility, rather duty, to provide compassionate appointment to her and the State cannot turn its back to a daughter, on unacceptable ground that she is married, who looks towards the State with the eyes of hope. 32) In Smt. Vimla Srivastava and others vs. State of U.P. and others10, the High Court of Allahabad observed as hereunder: 2016(1) ADJ 21 (DB) "The issue before the Court is whether marriage is a social circumstance which is relevant in defining the ambit of the expression "family" and whether the fact that a daughter is married can constitutionally be a permissible ground to deny her the benefit of compassionate appointment. The matter can be looked at from a variety of perspectives. Implicit in the definition which has been adopted by the state in Rule 2 (c) is an assumption that while a son continues to be a member of the family and that upon marriage, he does not cease to be a part of the family of his father, a daughter upon marriage ceases to be a part of the family of her father. It is discriminatory and constitutionally impermissible for the State to make that assumption and to use marriage as a rationale for practicing an act of hostile discrimination by denying benefits to a daughter when equivalent benefits are granted to a son in terms of the compassionate appointment. Marriage does not determine the continuance of the relationship of a child, whether a son or a daughter, with the parents. A son continues to be a son both before and after marriage. A daughter continues to a daughter. This relationship is not effaced either in fact or in law upon marriage. Marriage does not bring about a severance of the relationship between, a father and mother and their son or between parents and their daughter.

Result 28
Gujarat High Court
Kiranben Vallabhbhai Bhanderi vs Jamnagar Municipal Corporation ...
Honourable Judges A.S. Supehia
Date of Judgment: 28 July 2022
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 1
   
   
   

1. Rule. Learned advocate Mr.Sagar Gohel waives service of notice for the respondent. 2. At the outset, learned advocate Mr.Sagar Gohel appearing for the respondent has fairly submitted that subsequently the State Government has withdrawn the circulars dated 08.02.2016 and 10.03.2016. 3. In the present writ petition, the petitioner is seeking issuance of writ, order or direction for quashing and setting aside the communication dated 16.06.2021 passed by the respondent authority, whereby the application of the petitioner for change of birth of minor daughter Vrunda by incorporating the name and surname of her adoptive father Shri Mehul Chandubhai Mungra. 4. The brief facts of the case are as under:- 4.1. The Petitioner is the mother of minor child 'Vrunda', whose (date of birth is 05.04.2013), on whose behalf, the subject application for change of name of adoptive father and surname in the Birth Certificate was made. C/SCA/12854/2021 ORDER DATED: 28/07/2022 4.2. The marriage between the petitioner and Ashok Harjibhai Sangani i.e. the biological father of minor Vrunda was solemnised on 27.02.2011. The marriage was however dissolved by mutual consent and a divorce deed was executed and registered before the Sub-Registrar, Jamnagar on 14.11.2014, whereby the petitioner took custody and the entire responsibility of nurturing and bringing up minor Vrunda. 4.3. The Petitioner subsequently married with Shri Mehul Chandubhai Mungra on 29.03.2015 and has taken minor Vrunda with her at her matrimonial home where her step-father Shri Mehul Chandubhai Mungra has adopted minor Vrunda by way of a registered adoption deed dated 07.05.2015, executed between the petitioner and her husband Mehul Chandubhai Mungra. 4.4. The change in name of the adoptive father and surname of minor Vrunda was also published in the Gazette Notification No. 28, Volume LVI, dated 09.07.2015, whereby the name of the minor Vrunda was changed from "Vrunda Ashokbhai Changani" to "Vrunda Mehulbhai Mungra." 4.5. Subsequently, the petitioner moved an application dated 04.06.2021 before the Sub-Registrar (Births and Deaths Department), Jamnagar Municipal Corporation, requesting for change of name of her minor daughter Vrunda in her birth certificate by substituting the name of her adoptive father and surname inter alia on the basis of the registered adoption deed.

Result 29
Punjab-Haryana High Court
Rajpal Singh vs Surinder Kaur And Ors.
Honourable Judges R.L. Anand
Date of Judgment: 6 March 2000
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 10
   
   
   

Section 11 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 deals with the conditions for a valid adoption which run inter alia:- i) If the adoption is of a son, the adoptive father or mother by whom the adoption is made must not have a Hindu son, son's son's son (whether by legitimate blood relationship or by adoption) living at the time of adoption. ii) If the adoption is of a daughter, the adoptive father or mother by whom the adoption is made must not have a Hindu daughter or son's daughter (whether by legitimate blood relationship or by adoption) living at the time of adoption. iii) If the adoption is by a male and the person to be adopted is a female, the adoptive mother is at least twenty-one years older than the person to be adopted. iv) If the adoption is by a female and the person to be adopted in a male, the adoptive mother is atleast twenty-one years older than the person to be adopted. v) The same child may not be adopted simultaneously by two or more persons. vi) The child to be adopted must be actually given and taken in adoption by the parents or guardian concerned (or under their authority with intent to transfer the child from the family of its birth (or in the case of an abandoned child or child whose parentage is not known, from the place or family where it has been brought up) to the family of its adoption; Section 12 of the Act ibid deals with the effects of adoption, which runs as under:- a) The child cannot marry any person whom he or she could not have married if he or she had continued in the family of his or her birth; b) any property which vested in the adopted child before the adoption shall continue to vest in such persons subject to the obligations, if any attaching to the ownership of such property, including the obligation to maintain relatives in the family of his or her birth; c) the adopted child shall not divest any person of any estate which vested in him or her before the adoption.

Result 30
Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
The State Of West Bengal & Ors vs Purnima Das & Ors
Honourable Judges Dipankar Datta
Date of Judgment: 13 September 2017
Segment Number (Approximate Page Number): 20
   
   
   

In other words, it is not open to the State while granting a concession to proclaim that the married son would be entitled to consideration for compassionate appointment but not a married daughter, and this is constitutionally plainly impermissible. He asserted that the assumption made by the State that upon marriage a daughter ceases to be a member of her father's family and becomes the member of her husband's family is not relevant in the context of compassionate appointment, since it is the dependency factor that ought to assume importance over all other factors. With marriage the relationship of a daughter qua her parents does not stand determined; she continues to be a daughter even after her marriage and such relationship is not affected either in fact or in law. Marriage of a daughter does not bring about a severance of relationship between such daughter and her parents and their relationship is not governed or defined by marital status. 39. It has also been the contention of Mr. Mondal that marriage does not have a proximate nexus with identity and the identity of a woman as a daughter of her father continues to subsist even after and notwithstanding her marital relationship. He urged that the time has, therefore, come for the courts to affirmatively emphasise that it is not open to the State, if it has to act in conformity with the fundamental principles of equality embodied in Articles 14 to 16 of the Constitution, to discriminate against married daughters by depriving them of the benefits of consideration for compassionate appointment which is made available to a married son. 40. Mr. Mondal has referred to a common saying, "a son is a son until he gets a wife, a daughter is a daughter throughout her life" to blunt the effect of the notifications/SCHEME for compassionate appointment denying the right of entry of a married daughter in service on compassionate ground. 41. Referring to the facts in Kakali's original application, Mr. Mondal contended that she was entirely dependent on late Niva Rani Chakraborty and having regard to the ailments suffered by Kakali's husband and there being a male child born in their wedlock with 60% disability, she is entitled to be appointed in a Group - D post on compassionate ground.


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